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Abstract
This paper considers the arguments regarding the choice between an ideal
income tax and an ideal consumption tax, focusing on an argument made
by Atkinson and Stiglitz regarding neutral taxation of commodities. The
argument shows that a properly designed consumption tax is Pareto
superior to an income tax: it is more efficient and at least as good at
redistribution. The major exception to the Atkinson and Stiglitz result is
if individuals with equal wages have different propensities to save. In that
event, a consumption tax may no longer be Pareto superior to an income
tax. A consumption tax will continue, however, to be more desirable than
an income tax. It will be strictly more efficient than an income tax, and
under reasonable assumptions, better at redistributing from those who are
better off to those who are worse off. This result holds true even if one
heavily weights the welfare of the poor.
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The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax
Over an Ideal Income Tax
Joseph Bankman* and David A. Weisbach**
August 3, 2005
Perhaps the single most important tax policy decision is the choice
between an income tax and a consumption tax. The topic has been
discussed and argued over since at least the time of Hobbes (1651) and
Mill (1871) without apparent resolution.1 Consumption and income taxes
both represent substantial sources of revenue in all modern economies.
This paper considers the choice between an income tax and a
consumption tax focusing on an argument made by Anthony Atkinson and
Joseph Stiglitz in 1976 (AS 1976). AS 1976 shows that taxes should be
imposed on all commodities at the same rate – taxes should be neutral.
For reasons illustrated below, this conclusion implies that a consumption
tax is superior to an income tax. AS 1976 has recently attracted
substantial attention in the economics literature but, perhaps because the
arguments are technical, it has yet to receive any attention in the legal
literature.2 Our task here is to explain the intuition behind AS 1976 and
*
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1

The literature is immense. A sampling of cites includes Hobbes 1651, Mill
1871, Fisher 1906, Kaldor 1955, Andrews 1974, Graetz 1979, Warren 1980, Bradford
1980, Bradford 1984, Fried 1983, Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987, Shaviro 2000.
2

There are some hints of the argument in the legal literature but no cites to the
paper. For example, prior to the publication of AS 1976, Andrews 1974 at 1174-75
suggests a similar argument. Shaviro 2004 recently made an argument similar to AS
1976. The economics literature has also not fully absorbed their argument. For example,
Gravelle 1994 makes arguments that were refuted in AS 1976.
AS 1976 has been cited in the legal literature with respect to a related but
distinct consideration, which is whether legal rules should be used to redistribute. See,
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explore how applicable the model is to the real world. Our conclusion is
that ideal consumption taxes are superior to ideal income taxes.
We will generally compare only the ideal forms of income and
consumption taxation. The actual choice of a tax system has to be based
on how the system would be implemented, focusing on administrative and
compliance costs. Neither an income tax nor a consumption tax would
likely be implemented in their pure forms. Nevertheless, it is worth
examining the ideal forms for two reasons. First, determining which ideal
form is most desirable helps us design the actual systems and helps us
understand the flaws of the actual systems – ideals matter in tax reform.
Second, the case for the income tax is likely to be strongest if the
comparison is made between ideal forms. This is because the income
taxes we have had for almost a century is much worse than the ideal
income tax, and contains structural features that make reform difficult.
For example, an ideal income tax would tax the change in the value of
investments each year. Under existing law, the change in investment
value is taxed only if it is “realized” in the form of sale or exchange. The
so-called realization requirement is responsible for much of current taxrelated complexity and distortion. Elimination of that requirement,
however, raises difficult liquidity and valuation issues, and in part for
those reasons has never been seriously considered. An ideal income tax
would also measure gain and loss on an inflation-adjusted basis. Inflation
adjustments, while possible, would be difficult and also have never been
seriously considered. A consumption tax raises neither of these
difficulties and most scholars believe that a consumption tax is easier to
administer, and can be administered in purer form, than an income tax. By
comparing ideal systems and ignoring administration costs, we are
deliberately making the best possible case for the income tax. If a
consumption tax is superior to an income tax even ignoring the major
implementation problems of an income tax, if follows that it will be even
more desirable once those problems are taken into account.
for example, Kaplow & Shavell 1994.
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Section I provides background on income and consumption taxes
and reviews the most prominent arguments for an income tax. Section II
reviews the AS 1976 argument, first showing how it applies when
considering only the efficiency of the two tax bases, and then how it
applies when we consider redistribution.
Section III considers how labor income and wealth are related and
the extent to which the possibility of wealth without labor income affects
the arguments. It shows that if correctly implemented, a consumption tax
can tax such wealth and, therefore, such wealth should not affect the
choice between the two tax bases.
Most of the paper assumes that the tax system, while progressive,
taxes capital income at a flat rate. The system is progressive because the
wealthy have more capital income, and because wages or consumption are
taxed at a progressive rate. Section IV considers the possibility of
graduated rates on capital income. This subject is essentially unanalyzed
in the literature. Section IV argues that both consumption taxes and
income taxes can have graduated rates on capital income if so desired so
the issue is orthogonal to the central issue of this paper. Section IV also
offers some initial thoughts on whether capital income should be taxed at
graduated rates and concludes that it should not be.
Section V considers the difference between spenders and savings
and whether savers are better off in a manner that would support a income
tax. Section VI examines the argument that savings brings prestige,
power, and security, and that the benefit of savings is more than future
consumption. Section VII discusses the implicit assumptions of the AS
1976 model to get a better idea of what is driving their conclusions and
whether they make sense. Section VIII concludes.
I.

Background

In this section, we review the definitions of income, consumption,
and wage taxation and how they relate to one another. We then review the
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basic arguments given in favor of income taxation. Most, if not all, of this
material should be familiar to most readers, but we set it out here, very
briefly, for completeness.3
A.

Basic Definitions and Relationships among the Tax Bases

The only difference between an income tax and a consumption tax
and hence the only issue governing the choice between the two tax
systems is the taxation of the riskless return to savings. We derive this
conclusion in several steps below, using the assumption that capital
income is taxed at a flat rate. The conclusion also holds if capital income
is taxed with increasing marginal rates, but we defer the discussion of
more complex rate structures for Part IV below.4
An income tax is classically defined as a tax on consumption plus
any change in savings during the taxable period. Haig 1921, Simons
1938. Expressed as a formula, a so-called Haig-Simons income tax is:
Income = Consumption + ) Savings
A consumption tax is then equal to an income tax minus the tax on
the change in savings.
Consumption = Income - ) Savings
The key difference between an income tax and a consumption tax,
therefore, is the tax on the return to savings or capital income. In a
consumption tax, capital income is exempt while in an income tax it is
taxed.5
3

For more detailed discussion of the issues, see__.

4

Other than in Part IV, we will assume that capital income is taxed at flat rates.

5

As noted below, a consumption tax would, however, tax economic profits from
capital investments.
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A slightly more technical version of this characterization derives
from Brown 1948. Consumption in a period is net receipts for the period
less any amount saved – it is income minus savings. This means that a
consumption tax can be implemented through a cash flow system,
allowing a deduction for investments and taxing the entire amount
received when an investment is sold. This cash flow system is equivalent
to non-taxation of capital income because an immediate deduction for an
investment and a tax on the receipts when sold is equivalent in present
value terms to complete exemption of the return. Brown 1948. If we use
the rate of return on the investment to compute present values, the present
value of the tax in the future, when the investment is sold, is the same as
the deduction when the investment is made. For example, if the tax rate
is 30%, the value of deduction when the investment is made is 30% of the
amount of the investment. The tax on the future receipts is 30% of those
receipts. Because the present value of those receipts is the amount of the
investment, the present value of the future tax is the present value of the
value of the current deduction and, therefore, the value of the deduction
and the cost of the future tax exactly offset.
Note that this implies that a consumption tax is the same as a tax on
labor earnings. The reason is that on a going forward basis, there are two
sources of consumption: earnings from labor (wages) and earnings from
capital. If, in a consumption tax, capital income is not taxed, all that is left
to tax is wages. We, therefore, use the terms consumption tax and wage
tax interchangeably. There are significant differences between the two in
actual implementation. For example, not all labor earnings are paid out as
wages and a wage tax will not tax economic profits. Where these
differences matter, we will use the appropriate term.
The analysis so far, although the received wisdom 20 or 30 years
ago, is insufficiently nuanced. To get a better understanding of the
differences in the tax bases, we need to more closely examine the nature
of returns to capital. We can divide the return to capital investments into
three components: pure, riskless, time value returns, returns to bearing
risk, and economic profits.
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In general, neither ideal income taxes nor ideal consumption taxes
tax returns to risk bearing. This is clear in a consumption tax, which
generally exempts returns from capital. It is less obvious in an income
tax, which, on its face seems to tax returns to capital. Nevertheless, for
ideal, Haig-Simons income taxes, this proposition is now well accepted.6
The intuition is that income taxes reduce both the upside of winning bets
and the downside of losing bets in equal amounts. Winnings are taxed and
losses are deducted. The effect is to reduce the riskiness or variance of
outcomes. Individuals can restore their pre-tax riskiness merely by
increasing the size of their bets. Imagine a coin flip for $100 subject to a
50% tax. Absent tax, the individual taking this bet would win or lose
$100. After tax, the individual would win or lose $50. The individual
need merely double the bet to $200 to restore his pre-tax position.7 In our
existing tax system, individuals may not be able to do this because of
various rules such as loss limitations (whether they can is unclear, see,
e.g., Shuldiner draft), but in an ideal income tax the argument is
straightforward and here we are comparing ideal systems.8
6

There is a long line of literature on this issue originating with Domar and
Musgrave 1944. For relatively simple introductions, see Kaplow 1994, Weisbach,
forthcoming.
7

The individual will not be able to return to his precise pre-tax position if, due
to a graduated rate structure, gains are taxed at a higher rate than losses. However, under
plausible assumptions, the individual will still be able to offset most of the tax at little or
no cost by increasing the riskiness of his portfolio..
8

As noted in footnote _, we are assuming here that capital income is taxed at a
flat rate. If capital income is taxed under graduated rates, both income and consumption
taxes will burden risk. See Section IV for a discussion.
Most income tax proponents seem to have thought that a pure income tax did tax
returns to risk-bearing. The result that a Haig-Simons income tax does not tax returns to
risk-bearing therefore comes as a surprise and as a disappointment. One response might
be to reformulate an income tax in a way that does tax this return. Such a reformulation
has not been done, is not likely to be easy, and very well may result in an unattractive tax
system that no longer resembles an income tax. Until someone undertakes this task, we
will take Haig-Simons taxation as the canonical form of a income tax and with it, the
conclusion that income taxes do not tax returns to risk-bearing.
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Both income and consumption taxes tax rents, or economic profits.
Recall that if we think of a consumption tax as allowing an immediate
deduction for investments and imposing a tax on the sale, we know that
this is equivalent to no tax because the value of the immediate deduction
is equal in present value terms to the cost of the future tax when the
money is withdrawn. If the investment produces economic profits,
however, the investment will grow at a rate greater than the (risk adjusted)
rate of return. This means that the present value of the future tax will be
greater than the value of the deduction when the investment is made.
Thus, the claim made above that consumption taxes do not tax any returns
to capital was inaccurate in a potentially important way: consumption
taxes do tax profits, and profits may be major source of wealth. For
similar reasons, income taxes tax profits. Individuals cannot merely alter
their portfolios to offset the effect of a tax on profits like they can with
respect to the tax on risk-bearing. Because both tax profits, the treatment
of profits cannot be a reason for choosing between the two systems and we
will, from here on out, ignore the possibility of profits.
This leaves the tax on the risk-free, time value return as the only
difference between income and consumption taxes. Income taxes reduce
this return by the tax rate while consumption taxes do not. The choice
between income and consumption taxes, therefore, is whether it is
desirable to tax the risk-free return to savings.
B.

Implementation of Income and Consumption Taxes

Although we focus here on ideal systems rather than implementation
issues, it is worth reviewing the basic methods by which income and
consumption taxes can be imposed. There are two key observations.
First, the implementation methods for income and consumption taxes are
very similar, with the key difference being that consumption taxes do not
need to track the timing of transactions as carefully as an income tax.
Second, there is great flexibility in implementing a consumption tax,
including flexibility to make it progressive. This flexibility is important
to our (and AS 1976's) argument because for a consumption tax to be
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preferred to an income tax, it must be sufficiently progressive.
We can break implementation down along two dimensions: whether
the tax is imposed at the individual level or the business level, and
whether the tax uses a cash flow system or a basis system. Both income
and consumption taxes can be imposed at either level and through either
a basis or cash flow system.
Begin with a retail sales tax on all consumption goods imposed
directly on consumption purchases. This is a business level consumption
tax. A VAT is just a complicated (and better) method of collecting a
retails sales tax that reduces the possibilities for fraud by retailers.
Effectively a VAT is a sales tax imposed at each level of production (i.e.,
extraction, manufacture, wholesale, retail) with a deduction for taxes paid
at prior levels of production.
The major problem with a VAT is that it is imposed entirely at the
business level so it cannot be readily tailored to take into account the
circumstances of the individual consumer. An individual cash flow tax is
a consumption tax imposed solely at the individual level. In such a tax,
individuals would pay tax on the difference between receipts and
investment outlays, the difference, by definition, being consumption.
Such a tax can be progressive because higher amounts of consumption can
be taxed at higher rates. Individual tax returns would look much like they
do under an income tax except that individuals would deduct investment
expenses rather than get basis.
We can equivalently use a wage tax because, as discussed above, a
cash flow tax does not tax investment returns. If individuals only have
two types of returns, returns to labor and returns to investments, we can
achieve the same effect as a cash flow tax by merely taxing returns to
labor. Wage taxes are likely to be very simple to impose, but they also
present problems. In particular, they rely on individuals correctly labeling
receipts as wages rather than returns to capital, and this will be highly
manipulable. Bill Gates, for example, may pay himself low wages but
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consume a great deal. A cash flow tax does not depend on this labeling:
regardless of what Gates calls his receipts, when he uses them for
consumption he will be taxed. In addition, wage taxes do not tax
economic profits, unlike a cash flow tax. For these reasons, it is unlikely
that we would want to rely solely on a wage tax. We use the term wage
tax below merely for simplicity, with the understanding that an actual
consumption tax is unlikely to rely solely on the taxation of wages.
Individual consumption taxes can also use a basis system. Rather
than allowing an immediate deduction for investments, we can give
investors basis. Basis would be increased each period by the risk-free rate
of return and inflation so that when the basis is recovered, it has the same
present value as an up-front deduction. A basis system will tend to be
more complex than a cash flow system but may have certain advantages
with respect to tax rate changes. (Bradford, date).
Finally, with respect to consumption taxes, we can use a mixed
system, partially imposed at the business level and partially imposed at the
individual level. The Hall-Rabushka Flat Tax and Bradford’s X-tax are
examples of this. These taxes are the equivalent of a VAT but with a
deduction for wages (which would not normally be deductible) and a
progressive wage tax at the individual level. These mixed systems attempt
to combine the advantages of a VAT with the ability of a wage tax to be
tailored to individual circumstances. These taxes and their income tax
equivalents (see below) also tax wages at a progressive rate and capital at
a flat rate.
Income taxes have essentially parallel implementation systems. Our
current income tax uses a basis system: investors get basis in their
investments and recover it when they realize gain. The investment that
creates basis is made today but the basis is only recovered in the future,
which means that the present value of the benefit of tax basis is less than
its cost. This difference means that a basis system taxes the time value of
money, as is required under an income tax. The Haig-Simons income tax,
which we will take as the paradigmatic income tax, adds an extra layer on
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top of the basis system by valuing assets at the end of each period and
requiring a tax on the change in value. Periodic valuation is necessary
because, if an investment is held over many periods, appreciation in early
periods is not taxed until later periods under the pure realization system.
Income taxes can also be imposed through a cash-flow system9 or,
at the business level, through a VAT-like system10 Details of these
systems are irrelevant for our purpose. The key point is the degree of
flexibility in imposing consumption taxes.
C.

A Tax on the Return to Savings as a Non-Neutral
Commodity Tax

As noted, the difference between an income tax and a consumption
tax is the tax on the risk-free return to savings. We can (and will) think of
this tax as a non-neutral sales or commodity tax in the sense that it
imposes different rates on different consumption choices. Although the
tax on the return to savings imposes a very particular pattern of tax on
consumption choices, by characterizing a tax on the return to savings as
a non-neutral commodity tax, the choice between an income tax and
consumption tax can be seen as part of the more general question of
whether any uneven or non-neutral commodity tax is desirable.
To see why this is an apt description of a tax on the return to
savings, consider an individual, Z, who earns $100 in period one and is
considering whether to spend the sum in years one or two. Assume
arbitrarily that the pre-tax rate of interest is 5%. Absent taxes on interest
income, Z could either consume $100 of goods in period one or save the
$100, earn 5%, or $5, and consume $105 of goods in period two. The
$105 goods in period two have a present value to the individual of $100.
Assume, now, that the return to savings is taxed at a 40% rate, and so

9

Auerbach and Bradford [2002]

10

Treasury [1992]
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reduced to 3%. Z now must choose between consuming $100 in period
one or $103 in period two. The reduction from $105 to $103 has the same
effect as a sales tax of about 2% on period two consumption. If discount
rates remain constant, the market value of available period two
consumption drops to $98.10.11
The effective tax rate levied on future-consumed goods increases as
the time of consumption grows more distant. If, in the above example,
consumption is deferred for three years, the tax reduces available
consumption from $116 to $109 - the equivalent of a sales tax of 6.4%.
After 30 years, the amount available is reduced from about $430 to $240.
This is equivalent to a sales tax of about 80%. The choice between an
income tax and a consumption tax can be restated as whether such a sales
tax is desirable. As such, it is part of the general question of whether and
when non-neutral commodity taxes are desirable.
D.

Arguments for an Income Tax

There is a vast literature on the choice between an income tax and
a consumption tax, split in its support of one or the other.12 While there
are numerous arguments on the issue, we believe that there are two broad
reasons why many prefer an income tax to a consumption tax. The first
is an efficiency argument, which concludes that whether a consumption
tax is more efficient than an income tax depends on empirically
unknowable or indeterminate facts and, therefore, there should be no
presumption that one is more efficient than the other. The second is that
an income tax is better at redistribution. Given that the efficiency
effects of the choice are ambiguous and possibly unknowable but there are
clear distributive gains, we should support an income tax.
11

The burden to Z of the sales tax would be reduced to the extent the tax is borne
by borrowers; to the extent that occurs, the before-tax rate of return will rise. The
incidence of the tax, however, does not change its characterization as a sales tax. Sales
taxes may also be shifted between buyers and sellers.
12

See note _ for a partial list of papers.
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The efficiency argument, which we will call the trade-off theory,
compares the relative distortions of an income tax and a consumption tax.
A consumption tax does not tax the return to savings. This means that
savings decisions are undistorted and individuals choose the optimal
amount to consume at each date. A consumption tax does, however, tax
labor earnings, which means that decisions about how much to work are
distorted. An income tax taxes the return to savings, which means that
future consumption is relatively more expensive and savings decisions
will be distorted. The potential advantage of an income tax, however, is
that by taxing the returns to savings, the tax rate on labor earnings can be
lower, so that work decisions are distorted less under an income tax than
under a consumption tax. Whether a consumption tax or an income tax is
more efficient depends on the relative elasticities of savings and work
effort. As stated by one prominent economist,
The efficiency effects [of the choice between an income tax and a
consumption tax] depends on assumptions about behavioral
effects. If individuals are relatively unwilling to substitute
consumption over time and relatively willing to substitute leisure
for consumption of goods, then a significant tax on capital income
would constitute part of an optimal tax system. These behavior
effects are difficult to estimate empirically.
Gravelle 1994, 31.13 This same argument is repeated in the most
recently published public finance textbook, which is intended to
summarize economists’ basic understanding of these issues. Gruber 2005;
13

The trade-off theory bears a superficial resemblance to Ramsey-tax theory.
Under Ramsey taxation, we should levy a tax on goods with low elasticity of demand
because the quantities consumed are likely to change less when subject to taxation as
compared to good with high elasticities, minimizing deadweight loss. Moreover,
distortion rises with the square of tax rates which means that the tax base should be
broad; the distortion from the first dollar of tax on one commodity is very likely to be
smaller than the distortion from the nth dollar of tax on another commodity. The tradeoff theory differs from Ramsey tax-theory because it compares elasticities of labor and
savings rather than the elasticities of goods. The flaw in the trade-off theory is discussed
in II.A., infra.
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708.14
The second reason for supporting an income tax is distributive:
Income taxes are thought to have better distributive consequences than
consumption taxes. One version of this argument is that failure to tax
returns to savings leaves enormous pools of wealth untaxed, creating vast
inequalities in our society. Much of that wealth is created because of
general societal conditions such as property rights, an effective
government, the legal system, educated workers, natural resources, and
protection from invasions, conditions that have nothing to do with the
fortunate (although also skilled and hard-working) individual who earns
great wealth as a result. Society has a right to distribute that wealth as it
sees fit and it is just and fair to use it to reduce inequality.15
The more technical version of this argument is that transferring a
dollar from the wealthy to the poor increases welfare because the marginal
utility of money for a wealthy person is likely to be lower than it is for a
poor person.16 If utility goes up with income from capital as well as
income from labor, both should be used as a basis for redistributing. This
would seem to be true – someone with a large trust fund is unlikely to
value another dollar as much as someone working two jobs just to scrape
by. Redistributing one dollar from the trust fund baby to the working poor
is likely to increase overall welfare. Paris Hilton very likely has a much
lower marginal utility of money than someone slaving in the salt mines 60
hours a week to support his family. Redistribution from Paris Hilton to

14

Gruber claims that “[g]iven the evidence that labor supply is fairly inelastic . . .
most economists think efficiency would rise with a consumption tax that shifts the burden
of taxation for savings to labor. Given the lack of evidence on the response of savings to
its after-tax return, however, such a conclusion is only tentative.”
15
16

Murphy and Nagel 2002; Holmes and Sunstein (1999), Warren 1980.

This may not be true in every case. Some wealthy may crave additional wealth
more than the poor. But given that we must make some assumption about utility, an
assumption of declining marginal utility of wealth seems an unproblematic assumption.
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the worker makes sense.
A related but distinct version of this argument is that wealth brings
benefits beyond the value of future consumption. For example, wealth is
said to bring security, prestige, and power. Some have argued that an only
an income tax can tax this wealth and corresponding benefits, and
therefore, redistribute in ways that even a highly progressive consumption
tax cannot. Given the importance these commentators put on
redistribution, they conclude that an income tax is desirable.
These arguments are incorrect. A consumption tax is strictly more
efficient than an income tax and is equally good at redistribution. We
explain why immediately below, first discussing the trade-off theory and
then discussing redistribution. The “wealth as more than future
consumption” argument is reserved for Part VI.
II.

The AS 1976 Argument
A.

Efficiency

AS 1976 shows that the trade-off theory of efficiency is incorrect.
The reason is that the trade-off theory misses one of the effects of a tax on
the return to savings. In particular, a tax on the return to savings, or any
non-neutral commodity tax, has two effects. As widely noted, it distorts
savings decisions, but in addition, it distorts work effort. The trade off
theory misses this latter effect, the effect of a tax on savings on work
effort. A tax on savings distorts work effort for the simple reason that it
lowers the pay-off from work. Individuals who work today, planning on
consuming in the future will be able to consume less in the future for a
given hour of work exactly as if wages were taxed directly. Thus by
ignoring the latter effect, trade-off theory gets the efficiency calculus
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wrong.17
We illustrate this with an example that initially focuses on the choice
between any two commodities and then on the choice of whether to save.
The example uses an argument, which we will call the replicating tax
argument. AS 1976 did not use the replicating tax argument, but it has
since become standard in explaining the result.18 The replicating tax
argument shows that for any non-neutral commodity tax (including a tax
on savings), we can devise a tax only on consumption or equivalently,
wages, that raises the same revenue, but eliminates the distortion with
respect to the choice of which commodities to consume (or when to
consume them). The return to labor is actually increased. The replicating
tax, therefore, is a Pareto improvement over the non-neutral commodity
tax.
Consider a person (whom we will call “Middle” in the next section
when we consider redistribution) who has wage income of $50,000 and
spends it on two goods, Prunes and Figs. Suppose we have a wage tax of
50% and a tax on figs of 50%, but no separate tax on prunes. Given these
taxes, Middle has $25,000 after paying wage taxes to spend on prunes and
figs. Suppose Middle spends $20,000 on prunes and $5,000 on figs
(consisting of $2,500 on figs and $2,500 in taxes on the figs).19 Of the
17

Looking only at efficiency is, in an important sense, contrary to one of the key
points of AS 1976. They argue that the Ramsey analysis is wrong because if we
eliminate redistribution from the analysis, the most efficient tax is a head tax. Once
redistribution is added back in, a wage tax best distinguishes among individuals on the
basis of their ability. AS 1976 never considers the pure efficiency argument. The
discussion in the text treats efficiency separately merely to give the spirit of the argument
before moving on to the more complex case with redistribution.
18
19

See Hylland and Zeckhauser 1979, Saez 2002, Kaplow 2004.

We are assuming that the tax on figs is 50% of the total amount paid, including
taxes. Alternatively, the tax could stated on a tax exclusive basis, in which case would
use assume that Middle spends $3,333 on figs and pays taxes of $1,667. It doesn’t matter
which as long as the numbers are all done consistently through the remainder of the
example.
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$50,000 earned, he pays $27,500 in taxes and gets $22,500 in
consumption for the labor effort. We may assume that the tax has also
distorted Middle’s choice of whether to eat figs or prunes; that while he
still eat figs, he eats fewer figs than he would if they were not subject to
the additional tax.
The replicating tax is a tax on only wage income that provides the
government the same revenue as the non-neutral consumption tax. In our
example, Middle pays $27,500 in taxes and gets $22,500 in consumption.
The replicating tax would be a tax of $27,500 on wags or a 55% tax.
Middle will now have $22,500 left after paying the wage tax and have the
same amount available for consumption as before. However, Middle will
be better off because he can choose how to spend his after-tax income
more freely – his choice between prunes and figs is no longer distorted.
The perceived value of the consumption available to him will increase.
His return to labor actually rises as the tax on figs is replaced by a tax on
wages. The replicating tax, therefore, is a Pareto improvement over the
50% wage/fig tax – Middle is better off and the fisc is equally well off.20
The key fact missed by the trade-off theory is that the tax on figs
reduces Middle’s labor effort. Assuming he wants to eat some figs,21
Middle will know that each hour of work will produce fewer figs than
without the tax. Work is correspondingly less rewarding just as if it were
taxed directly. Moreover, the tax on figs is an inefficient tax on labor
because in addition to paying the explicit tax, Middle will suffer an
additional decline in welfare to the extent the tax has led him to substitute
20

There is an important and subtle difference between the adjustments to the tax
schedule described here and that found in much of the literature, such as Kaplow 2004.
The usual approach is to adjust the wage tax to hold utility constant and show that this
raises more revenue than the alternative, non-neutral tax. We adjust the wage tax to keep
revenue rather than utility constant. Our adjustment is based entirely on observable
variable – the revenue raised at each wage level under the commodity tax. By basing the
adjustment on observable variable, however, we give up flexibility in how the Pareto
improvements are distributed.
21

If Middle never consumes any figs, the tax on figs is a nullity.
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prunes for his preferred good, figs. Replacing the tax on figs with a small
increase in wage tax will eliminate this latter form of welfare loss. This
result will hold anytime the tax causes Middle to substitute prunes for figs.
He will pay an explicit tax and suffer an additional decline in welfare due
the substitution way from his preferred good. The pure wage tax will
always eliminate this latter form of welfare loss. We do not have to know
anything about the so-called Ramsey factors – the relative elasticities of
figs or prunes – to know that the replicating tax, a pure wage tax, is more
efficient than the non-neutral tax.22
The use of prunes and figs in the example is obviously intended to
hint at consumption in the present and the future. The argument is exactly
the same regardless of whether the non-neutrality is between two
commodities consumed today or between consumption today and in the
future. As noted, a tax on the return to savings is like a sales tax that
increases the cost of future consumption just like the tax on figs increases
the cost of figs. The tax on future consumption (Figs) reduces the return
to labor because the individual knows that each hour of effort produces
fewer goods at the future date. The trade-off theory misses the effect of
the tax on the return to savings on labor effort. Moreover, the tax on the
return to savings is less efficient than a pure labor tax because in addition
to raising revenue, it causes the individual to chose consumption today
instead of his preferred good, consumption in the future. As with the
prune/fig case, the result does not depend at all on the relative elasticity
of savings and labor. A wage tax is more efficient even if labor income
is highly elastic and savings highly inelastic.23
22

There are two (unrealistic) assumptions under which the wage tax will not be
more efficient. First, if Middle is completely indifferent between prunes and figs he can
costlessly avoid the tax on figs by giving up figs. The tax will not be inefficient – but it
will raise no revenue. Second, if Middle’s demand for figs is completely inelastic and so
he consumes as many figs as before, the tax is as efficient as a wage tax because it does
not impose an additional welfare loss by causing Middle to give up a preferred good.
23

Said another way, to have any force, the trade-off theory has to assume that the
tax on figs or on future consumption does not effect labor effort. Instead, it only affects
the choice between figs and prunes, future and present. Although the effect on labor
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Note that the AS 1976 argument does not require us to view interest
income as compensation for the pain of deferring consumption – it does
not need to make equal utility arguments of the sort that have been
addressed in some of the literature. See Gunn 1979, Kelman 1983.
Instead, we need merely to view the interest rate as setting the price of
goods to be consumed in the future and a tax on interest income as
increasing that price. Given that a person saves (other than with respect
to his last, marginal dollar of savings), he very much likes that price and
is better off for taking it. Therefore, he is more than compensated by
interest for the pain of deferring consumption. This fact, however, is
entirely irrelevant, just as it is irrelevant that he likes the price of prunes
and is better off for buying prunes at their going price and just as it is
irrelevant that a tax on labor ignores the fact that wages compensate
individuals for the costs of work.
The major caveat to the efficiency argument is the possibility that
figs (or future consumption) are a relative complement to leisure (i.e.,
more of a complement to leisure than are prunes or present
consumption).24 If this is the case, making figs less attractive makes
leisure less attractive. If leisure is less attractive, the labor tax will distort
work effort less. Why not spend more hours at the office given that free
time is no longer as pleasurable? A tax on figs in this case would be
efficient. Alternatively, if figs are a relative substitute for leisure, a

effort is relatively easy to miss, once it has been pointed out, it is hard to see a
justification for such an assumption. Perhaps one can offer various psychological
theories for why people misperceive the effect of various taxes, but the trade-off theory
purports to apply classical economics and such an assumption is entirely unjustified
within standard economics A tax on future consumption reduces the value of work today
and, therefore, has the same distorting effect as a direct tax on that work.
24

The technical name for the assumption that neither commodity is a relative
complement for leisure is weak separability. Under weak separability, an individual’s
utility function can be stated as a function of two variables, work effort and a function of
commodities. That is utility is equal to U(w, v(ci)) where the w is work effort, ci are the
various commodities one can consume, and v is a subutlity function that determines the
utility from consumption.
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subsidy for figs would be desirable. The same goes for consumption in
the present and in the future. If future consumption is a relative
complement for leisure, some tax on future consumption might be
desirable. If future consumption is a relative substitute for leisure, a
subsidy for future consumption might be desirable.
While arguing that future consumption is a relative complement for
leisure is perhaps a way to support an income tax, it does not restore the
trade-off theory. The elasticity of savings is still irrelevant. Moreover,
there is little reason to believe that savings is a relative complement to
leisure. Unlike the empirical quagmire of the trade-off theory where the
elasticities could be any which way and proponents can cite studies that
support various conclusions, there is no empirical or theoretical reason to
believe that future consumption is a relative complement to leisure.
Moreover, for the argument to support an income tax, it would have to be
the case that the relative complementarity of future consumption with
leisure increases as consumption gets more distant because the “sales tax”
on future consumption is larger the further away the consumption. Indeed,
once we consider relative complementarity with leisure, it is just as likely
that future consumption should be subsidized as taxed.
More generally, while it is the case that a pure wage tax might be
improved by taxing relative complements to leisure and subsidizing
relative substitutes for leisure, what such taxes might look like is obscure.
We would want to tax items that take a long time but are relatively
inexpensive and subsidize short but expensive items. For example, we
might want to tax long books and subsidize rock concerts. Similarly, we
might want to tax food prepared at home and subsidize food eaten at
restaurants, the opposite pattern from most VATs in the world today. See
Iowerth and Whalley 2002, Kaplow 2004. Therefore, while the technical
economics literature views the “relative complementarity problem” as
important (see Deaton 1981), from a practical point if view, it has no
obvious bearing on the choice between an income and consumption tax.
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Redistribution

We can now add redistribution to the analysis. The argument is
straightforward given the efficiency analysis above. The efficiency
analysis considered a single individual and showed that we can replace a
non-neutral tax (such as a tax on savings) with a consumption or wage tax
(the replicating tax) to make that individual better off. To add distribution
to the analysis, we simply perform this same substitution of tax systems
at each income level. Following the same argument, at each income level,
individuals would be better off. The replicating tax, therefore, is a Pareto
improvement over an income tax even when redistribution is taken into
account. A wage or consumption tax, properly structured, is thus
preferable to an income tax and this holds entirely without regard to our
views on how much redistribution is appropriate.
We can analogize the argument for a tax on savings to the argument
for a luxury tax. The argument for a luxury tax is that only the rich can
afford to save or to purchase luxuries. A tax on luxuries, therefore, seems
to have good distributive properties which might outweigh any
inefficiencies. Notwithstanding the possible distributive properties,
however, a luxury tax is not desirable. For each income class, we can
determine their luxury purchases and replace the luxury tax with the
replicating wage tax. For example, suppose that those who earn between
$30,000 and $50,000, $50,000 and $100,000, $100,000 and $200,000, and
so forth, tend to purchase luxuries with a given percent of their earnings,
the percentage going up with income. As illustrated above, we can adjust
the tax on their labor earnings to replicate the effect of the luxury tax.
With such an adjustment, each income class will pay the same total tax.
Distribution, therefore, is held constant, but the overall system is more
efficient. Indeed, the efficiency gains can be traded off for more
redistribution, if so desired. If the gains from eliminating the luxury tax
are used to create more redistribution, the more one favors redistribution,
the more one should be against a luxury tax.
The identical argument applies to a tax on the return to savings. The
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argument for a tax on the return to savings it that the rich save more than
the poor, so savings is like a luxury good. On the surface, taxing it seems
to have good distributive properties, but for the same reason that the
luxury tax is undesirable, a tax on savings is undesirable.
To fill this in, we expand the example used in the prior section.
Suppose there are three types of individuals in society: poor, middle, and
rich, with middle the same as above. They consume two types of
commodities, figs and prunes. The rich consume more figs and fewer
prunes (relative to their total) than do the middle class, and similarly for
the middle class compared to the poor.
Suppose that we have a flat-rate wage tax of 50% and a tax on figs
of 50%, the tax on figs but not prunes being justified on the theory that the
rich consume relatively more figs, so such a tax is progressive. We use a
flat rate wage tax here for illustration, but the wage tax could have any
structure and the argument would still work.25 Moreover, the replicating
tax we use is a progressive wage tax, but given the equivalence between
wage taxes and consumption taxes in the absence of economic profits, we
could also have used a progressive consumption. We use a wage tax
merely because it simplifies the presentation. Suppose that given these
taxes, incomes and consumption amounts are as follows:

25

Kaplow 2004 demonstrates this formally.
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Poor

Middle

Rich

Pre-tax wage
income

$25,000

$50,000

$100,000

Wage taxes (50%
rate)

$12,500

$25,000

$50,000

After-tax wages

$12,500

$25,000

$50,000

Prune consumption

$12,500

$20,000

$25,000

Fig consumption
(including tax)

$0

$5,000

$25,000

Fig tax

$0

$2,500

$12,500

Total taxes paid

$12,500

$27,500

$62,500

Taxes as a percent
of wages

50%

55%

62.5%

In the argument on efficiency above, we replaced Middle’s wage/fig
combination tax with a wage tax that produced the same total taxes. We
make the same adjustment here except that we do so for each type of
individual separately. Therefore, we eliminate the combination wage/fig
tax and replace it with a new, more progressive wage tax with rates of
50% on Poor, 55% on Middle, and 62.5% on Rich. This tax is a Pareto
improvement over the wage/fig combination tax.
As in the case with only one individual, under the new structure,
both Middle and Rich are better off. (Poor is neutral rather than better off
because he did not consume figs.) Given the tax on figs and not prunes,
Middle and Rich presumably reduced their figs consumption to an amount
lower than they desire. The new tax structure gets rid of this distortion,
allowing them to make better consumption decisions (more figs, less
prunes). Since Middle and Rich pay the same amount of tax but have
more attractive consumption choices, their return to labor has increased.

Consumption Taxation

Page 23

Redistribution is constant because each individual pays the same tax
under the replicating wage tax as in the wage/fig tax structure. If each
individual pays the same tax, we have replicated the distributive effects of
a tax on figs with a tax on wages. If Middle and Rich respond to the
increased return to labor by increasing their labor supply, there is more
money available for redistribution.26
Now translate Prunes into Present consumption and Figs into Future
consumption (savings). The fig tax becomes the tax on interest income.
The argument that the tax on interest income is undesirable is identical to
the argument that the tax on figs is undesirable. The tax on interest
income may redistribute from the rich to the poor, but we can achieve
equal redistribution through a more progressive tax on labor income that
does not distort savings decisions. Everyone would be better off.
Note that the argument does not depend on the relative degree of
inequality in our society or our preferences for redistribution. Therefore,
the recent increases in inequality have no bearing on the choice between
an income tax and a consumption tax. Similarly, one’s views on the
appropriate extent of redistribution have no effect on the argument. Even
if we believe in substantial redistribution, a consumption tax remains
superior. In fact, as indicated above with respect to a luxury tax, the more
we prefer redistribution the more we might want a consumption tax
because the Pareto advantages can be used to redistribute more rather than
to increase efficiency.
Note also, the argument does not depend on the usual arguments for
taxing consumption. For example, it does not matter what one thinks
about the alleged unfairness of taxing income twice, once when it is
earned and once when it is invested and earns interest. Mill 1871.
Similarly, it does not rely on common pool arguments, (Hobbes 1651),
26

Whether the new structure increases work effort depends on the relative
strengths of the substitution and income effects.
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equal sacrifice ideas (Bradford 1980); nor, as noted above, does it depend
on the nature of interest income as compensation for the pain of deferral
or as rents (Kelman 1983).
The key assumption in the argument, one we suspect may be
counter-intuitive to many readers, is that a consumption tax can be as
redistributive as an income tax. There are two reasons why we might
think consumption taxes cannot redistribute as well as income taxes. First,
the model has no inherited wealth or wealth created prior to transition to
a consumption tax. Trust fund kids may have relatively little labor
income, so adjusting the tax on their labor income to substitute for the tax
on their wealth only seems to help these idle rich. The AS 1976 argument
instead assumes instead that individuals work to earn various amounts of
money, some of which is saved. In the real world, this seems not to be the
case.
Second, we have assumed that taxing earnings is an effective
substitute for taxing savings. Individuals with the same amount of
earnings, however, may save different amounts. Eliminating the tax on
savings and replacing it with a higher tax on earnings will benefit
individuals with a given level of earnings who save a lot at the expense of
individuals with the same earnings who save little. Depending on our
views about this type of redistribution, we might support an income tax.
We might, for example, believe that an individual with the same earnings
as others but higher wealth (because he saved more) is better off and
should be taxed at a higher rate. This might be because wealth
(consumption in the future) brings more utility than early consumption.
It might alternatively be because wealth brings benefits independent of
consumption. (Note that we do not mention profits here. The supernormal returns of some individuals are taxed under both systems. Much
of the intuition that consumption taxes are insufficiently redistributive
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may come from the erroneous view that they do not tax profits.)27
If a consumption tax cannot redistribute as well as an income tax,
because of these assumptions or others, the AS 1976 argument fails. A
consumption tax would still be more efficient than an income tax but this
efficiency benefit would have to be balanced with the redistributive gains
from an income tax. In the next two sections, we consider this issue in
more depth.
III.

Wealth without Labor Income

The model shows that the distributive effects of a non-neutral tax on
a commodity, such as figs, luxuries, or consumption in the future, can be
replicated with a tax on labor income. The procedure we used above was
is to increase the tax on labor income by the amount each individuals
bears of the tax on the commodity. To make this adjustment in the manner
demonstrated, individuals must have labor income to be taxed. Many
wealthy individuals, however, appear to have little or no labor income,
making the envisioned adjustment problematic. For a wealthy retiree, or
a trust-fund baby, eliminating the tax on savings and replacing it with a
more progressive wage tax would seem to be manna from heaven. Both
benefit from the elimination of tax on investment income and neither have
significant amounts of wage income. Similarly, Bill Gates pays himself
a very small salary. Instead, he takes most of his earnings as capital gains
on the sale of Microsoft stock. There is no adjustment to the wage tax that
would offset the benefits to Gates of eliminating the tax on capital. We
will argue that these sort of examples are misleading and the intuition
behind the examples wrong. If the consumption/wage tax is properly
27

Another possibility that we suspect is in the back (or front) of the minds of
many supporters of an income tax is that a consumption tax would, in reality, not end up
being as progressive as an income tax. Kelman (1983), p. 679, for example, makes this
explicit. We are not sure why this would be true. If we were going to consider political
outcomes, we would also have to consider the long-term reluctance of the political
branches to fully tax capital income under an income tax. In any event, this consideration
seems irrelevant to the comparison of ideal income and consumption taxes.
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structured and understood, these examples pose no problems for the AS
1976 analysis.
The solution lies in the distinction between a wage tax and a
consumption tax. So far we have been treating them as identical and most
often using the term wage tax for both. As noted, however, there are
important differences and the problems highlighted above are problems
with wage taxes, not consumption taxes By using a properly structured
“replicating consumption tax,” we can eliminate the problems of apparent
wealth without labor income.
To see the difference, compare a flat rate wage tax and a flat rate
retail sales tax on all goods and services (a consumption tax). The wage
tax is imposed when wages are earned. There is no further tax down the
road when the earnings are used to purchase consumption. A retail sales
tax is not imposed when wages are earned. Instead, taxes are imposed
only when the individual purchases consumption goods, often many years
after the wages are earned. One might say loosely that a wage tax is ex
ante while a retail sales tax is ex post. In fact, most consumption taxes are
largely ex post. The two most likely forms of progressive ex post
consumption taxes to replace the income tax are the Flat Tax or X-tax,28
and the personal cash flow tax.
Consider the individual who has substantial labor income that is
incorrectly labeled as capital income. This is the Bill Gates problem. He
did not make a big investment in Microsoft. Instead, most of his net worth
comes from his labor. Nevertheless, most of his income appears to come
from capital – in the form of dividends or stock sales. A wage tax will
not pick up this income. An ex post consumption tax, however, will tax
this income to the extent it is really attributable to his labor. The reason
is that a consumption tax ignores the labels put on earnings because the
28

As noted, the Flat Tax or X-tax is an ex post tax at the business level and a
wage tax at the individual level. It would be an ex post tax for the purposes of dealing
with wealth attributable to Gates’ labor in Microsoft, since it would tax the distribution
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tax is not imposed directly on earnings. Instead, a tax is imposed when the
earnings are spent and the source of the earnings is irrelevant. Therefore,
to the extent that Gates’s stock value reflects his labor income, it is taxed
under a properly structured consumption tax.29 The hidden labor problem
can readily be solved.
The wealthy retiree problem can also be solved with an ex post
consumption tax. She benefits from the elimination of tax on capital but
we cannot go back and levy a more progressive tax on her wages. Under
an ex post consumption tax, we tax her consumption when it occurs.30
The retiree problem is really one of transition to a consumption tax.
Had a consumption tax been imposed all along, there would be no issue.
Either the retiree would have paid a progressive wage tax when she earned
the money, or she would have not paid any tax on wages that were used
to fund deferred consumption until the time of that consumption, and then
would be taxed on that consumption. The retiree problem comes about
because the retirees earned and saved under an income tax. There is a
large literature discussing this transition issue. Instead of reviewing that
literature, we make three points.
First, the comparison between the ideal forms of an income tax and
a consumption tax should be made as if each had always been in place.
The goal is to find out which system is more desirable. If we assume that
one system or the other is already in place, it biases the argument toward

29

One way to conceptualize this is that under a cash flow tax, Gates gets no
deduction for his labor effort so to the extent gains on his stock are due to labor effort,
there was no earlier deduction for an investment that offsets that tax on the sale.
In the flat-tax or X-tax, taxation does not necessarily occur at the time of
consumption but instead occurs at the time cash is distributed from Microsoft. This
should have the same present value effect on Gate’s wealth.
30

The operation of a Flat Tax or X-tax is a bit more complicated, but, as noted in
note __, yields the same net present value result.
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the status quo because transition in either direction (from income to
consumption or consumption to income) is likely to be difficult. Rather
than assume a status quo, we should instead determine which base is
preferable writing from a blank slate.31 If it turns out one base is
preferable but we currently use the other base, we can then determine
whether the transition costs are worth the benefit, but the first task is to
determine which is preferable. Said another way, it is quite a different
thing to believe that an income tax is desirable than to believe that a
consumption tax is desirable but we face a serious transition problem.
Research agendas would shift from determining how to perfect the income
tax to how to transition out of it.
Second, it is not clear that the presence of retiree wealth makes a
transition to a consumption tax more or less desirable. Consider, for
example, the adoption of either the Flat Tax, the X-tax or a cash flow
consumption tax.. Because retirees have already been taxed on the wages
and investment income that produced their current wealth, it might seem
unfair to tax that wealth when consumed. On the other hand, taxation of
retiree consumption might produce efficiency gains that could be used to
fund lower overall rates.32

31

In fact, it would be a bad idea even if we were to assume a status quo to
assume that it is the income tax. Although the U.S. federal government currently relies to
some extent on a version of an income tax, it also relies significantly on a wage tax.
Moreover, other governments, states and foreign, rely heavily on consumption taxes. An
answer that income taxes are more desirable would raise the issue of transition from a
consumption tax to an income tax.
32

The efficiency gains would come about because the retirees had already
worked and saved and therefore an extra level of tax on their wealth would not distort
their behavior. In contrast, known ex ante (such as a wage or consumption tax after
transition) would affect work effort and so produce efficiency costs. However, some or
all (or more than all) of these gains might be lost if the imposition of the extra tax caused
taxpayers in the future to worry that the government might similarly impose an extra tax
on their work effort, as well. There might be additional efficiency losses if the extra tax
was anticipated because holders of soon-to-be-taxed wealth could avoid the tax by
consuming . See ____
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Finally, the transition problem is not inherent to the choice between
a consumption tax and a wage tax. Instead, it is one of the effects of
switching between different methods of collecting tax. See Shaviro 2000
for an extensive discussion.
The case of the trust-fund baby is roughly parallel to that of the
retiree. Under an ex post consumption tax, we can get at her wealth when
it is consumed. Fundamentally, though, the problem is one of transition.
Had a progressive wage-tax been in place when the money used to fund
the trust was earned, her donor would have had less to invest, and the
trust-fund baby would have less to now spend. In that event, the tax due
from her trust would have been “pre-paid” by the donor33. Alternatively,
had an ex post consumption tax been in place when the money was earned,
the donor would not have been taxed on the wages that were used to fund
the trust, and the income from the investment would be taxed at the time
of consumption.
IV.

Graduated Marginal Taxes on Investment Income

The income tax base does not require any particular rate structure:
it may be either graduated or flat. The same is true with respect the
consumption tax base. As noted, the two taxes differ in their treatment of
investment income and our comparisons thus far have assumed that under
an income tax, investment income is taxed at a flat rate. The tax on
investment income disproportionately burdens high wage earners, not
because that income itself is taxed at a progressive rate but because high
wage-earners save more and have more of that income. The assumption
that the income tax on investment income is flat is supported by many
provisions of current law, but is obviously contradicted by other

33

If the rate structure is progressive, then the tax paid under a progressive wage
tax may be greater or less than the tax paid under an ex post consumption tax, since the
taxes will be paid by different persons in different years subject (perhaps) to different
rates.
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provisions.34 An alternative assumption is that under an income tax,
investment income should be taxed under a graduated rate structure,
usually assumed to be increasing marginal rates. In that case, as
investment income grows, the rate at which it is taxed increases.
There is very little, if any, literature, analyzing the effects of taxing
capital income at graduated rates. The literature on optimal progressivity
analyzes only wage taxes.35 Mirrlees 1971. Arguments in favor of an
income tax because of the distributive effect of taxing capital income are
not explicit about the rate structure to be imposed on capital income and
usually discuss progressivity arising solely because of the fact of taxing
capital income. See, e.g., Gravelle 1994; Gruber 2005. Given the lack of
prior analysis of the issue and the complexity of the problem, we limit
ourselves to two points. First, we argue that the issue is orthogonal to the
choice between income and consumption taxes because both types of taxes
can equally impose graduated rates on the returns to risk taking, which, as
we will argue, is the relevant dimension. Second, we will offer some
preliminary analysis of the effects of imposing graduated rates on capital
income and conclude that it is unlikely to be desirable. Our views on the
second point are preliminary but the first point alone should be sufficient
for purposes of this paper.

34

The current rate structure is progressive, on capital as well as other sources of
income, so that, over certain ranges, additional income is taxed at higher rates. On the
other hand, many individuals are already at the maximum rates and so will face a flat rate
on investment income; this is particularly true with respect to investments that produce
dividend income and capital gain, where the maximum rate is reached at relatively low
levels of income. Many corporate investors are also in the maximum rate with respect to
investments.
35

Moreover, the problem of graduated rates on capital income is distinct from
that with respect to labor income so we cannot apply intuitions from that literature to
capital income. The optimal labor income tax problem is centered on creating taxes that
cause individuals to reveal their true wage rates. The problem is one of mechanism
design. The problem of the optimal rate structure on capital income can be seen as an
insurance problem, reducing the harms of losing risky bets.
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To see that the issue is unrelated to the choice between income and
consumption taxes, consider first, the treatment of the riskless return under
a rate structure with increasing marginal rates. The total tax on investment
income is now comprised of a pure time value of money tax and a
supplemental tax due to the rate increase. The result is a higher and more
inefficient tax on capital income, as can be seen using the same replicating
tax argument made above.
For example, a wage-earner in the 50% bracket who realizes $50
of interest income on a $1000 investment finds her return reduced to $25.
If the investment income is taxed under a progressive rate structure and
pushes the individual to a 60% bracket, the return is reduced to $20. A
replicating consumption tax can achieve the same distributional effect
without reducing the return to capital. Therefore, as in the main case
above, replacing the income tax with one of these taxes will increase
welfare without affecting the distribution of the tax burden among
different wage or consumption classes. Indeed, since the tax on capital
has now risen, the relative desirability of those forms of consumption tax
increases.36
The only possible argument, therefore, for a graduated tax on capital
income is with respect to risky returns. Both income and consumption
taxes, however, can equally use graduated taxes on risky returns. For
example, a cash flow consumption tax can use graduated rates so that if an
individual wins a bet, she is taxed at a higher rate than if she loses the bet.
McCaffery 2005 advocates for a consumption tax of this sort. Thus,
regardless of one’s views on graduated taxes on risky returns, they should
not affect the choice between an income tax and a consumption tax.

36

Those forms of tax also have the added advantage of measuring wealth on an
ex ante basis, so as to levy equal present value taxes on equal present value wealth.
From this perspective, giving up the progressivity-related tax increase should is not
troublesome, because, in applying that tax, wealth has been mismeasured. The wageearner who, presented with a choice of saving or spending, chooses to save is not
wealthier and should not pay a higher tax on her future consumption. See, however, ___.
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Although our analysis is still preliminary,37 it seems unlikely that
graduated taxes on risky returns would be desirable. The motivation for
such a rate structure is that risky outcomes are a matter of luck rather than
effort, and it is appropriate to reduce or eliminate differences in outcomes
due purely to good and bad luck. Sen [1970; 141-146], Diamond [1967],
Harsanyi [1953; 312-314].
An analysis of whether or how to reduce differences in lucky
outcomes must begin by asking why we have these differences. If
individuals are optimally diversified, there should be no such differences
– everyone would have the same portfolio. Individuals may not be fully
diversified for a variety of reasons. They might, for example, hold a
concentrated ownership in a small business that they cannot sell at a fair
price because of a lemons market or adverse selection. Alternatively, they
might hold a concentrated ownership in a business because of moral
hazard problems. That is, it might be efficient to hold a concentrated
position to improve incentives. If the problem is adverse selection,
government provided reduction in risk might be optimal but if the problem
is moral hazard, it would not. Other individuals might not be diversified
because of transactions costs, in which case we might ask whether the
additional risk reduction provided through the tax system has lower
transactions costs that the additional risk reduction available in the market.
Suppose that we conclude that, on balance, it is desirable to reduce
differences in outcomes due to luck. It is not clear, in such a case, that
increasing graduated rates would be desirable. Consider as a baseline, the
case where there are no behavioral responses to the tax system and,
therefore, we want to entirely eliminate differences due solely to luck. To
have a concrete example, suppose two identical individuals each have
$100 which they invest in a risky asset. Suppose that the asset will pay
37

Our analysis does not, for example, consider revenue constraints and general
equilibrium effects. A more complete analysis would likely be based on the optimal
insurance contract literature because the social goal in this case would be very much like
the goals of private insurance contracts.
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either $120 or $90 with equal probability. To keep the example simple,
suppose that the payoff is instantaneous.
To eliminate differences in outcomes, we would give each individual
the expected value of the bet, or $105. The tax structure that would
achieve this has decreasing marginal rates. The loser would have to be
able to deduct his loss at a rate of 150% and the winner would pay taxes
on his gains of 75%.38 The intuition for this result is that if one loses
money, higher tax rates are better.39
The analysis is more complex once we allow behavioral changes
and, therefore, must consider efficiency effects. Complete elimination of
differences in this case is unlikely to be optimal because it would effect
incentives to take risk. Moreover, portfolio shifts in response to the tax on
risk can have counter-intuitive effects.
Consider the same bet, a $100 bet that pays either $120 or $90 and
suppose that we are considering imposing three different rate structures:
a flat 50% rate, increasing marginal rates of 40% and 60%, and decreasing
marginal rates of 60% and 40%. We know with a flat rate structure of
50%, we can think of individuals as borrowing and doubling their bets to
$200. After paying taxes and paying back the loan, they will be left in the
same position as if there were no-tax, having either $90 or $120. A flat
rate structure does not reduce differences in outcomes due to risk.
Suppose we impose increasing marginal rates. Individuals making
38

An alternative rate structure that gives the same result would be a 100% tax on
all returns and a demogrant of $15 to each individual. This, however, is a flat structure,
not an increasing marginal rate structure.
39

Consider loss limitations. They create increasing marginal rates because
losers, facing disallowance of loss deductions, effectively face a marginal rate of zero.
Winners face a positive marginal rate. Loss restrictions are thought to hurt losers,
illustrating that high rather than low marginal rates on those who lose bets may be more
desirable.
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the bet will not know the rate at which the payoff will be taxed, so they
will not know how to adjust their portfolios. There are any number of
possibilities, but consider three. First, they may adjust their portfolio
using the tax rate on losses or 40%. Winners would find that they had not
increased their bets enough to offset the 60% tax on their winnings and
would be left with only $113 after all is said and done.40 Losers would
have correctly adjusted their portfolio and would be left with $90. In this
case, the tax has reduced the difference in outcomes.
Second, they may adjust their portfolios based on the gain rate, or
60%. Winners, in this case, would have made the correct adjustment and
be left with $120. Losers, however, would have adjusted their portfolios
counting on deducting losses at 60% but only be able to deduct them at
40%. Having increased the size of a losing bet and then not getting to
deduct the loss at the higher tax rate, they would be worse off than without
taxes, ending up with only $85.41 Increasing marginal rates, in this case
would increase differences in outcomes, the opposite of the desired effect.
Finally, they may adjust somewhere in the middle, say at 50%. In this
case, winners end up with only $116, worse off by $4. Losers, however,
also worse off than without taxes, losing $2 and ending up with $88. A
flat rate structure Pareto dominates this case. Note, however, that the
various cases leave the government with a different amount of money ($7
in the case of adjustments to a 60% rate, $5 for a 40% rate, and $6 for a
50% rate). To make them comparable we would have to adjust the rate
structure or refund some of the tax revenue. Nevertheless, the analysis
gives a basic indication of the likely directions of the effects.
The result is the opposite with decreasing marginal rates. If they
40

They increase their bet by 1/(1-t) or 166.67% in our case. If they win, the
$166.67 turns into $200. They have gain of $33.33 and pay taxes of $20. After paying
taxes and paying back $66.67, they are left with $113.
41

They increase their bet to $250. They lose money, ending up with only $225.
Having lost $25 on their bet, the deduct it and get a tax benefit of 40% of that loss, or
$10. After paying back $150, they are left with $85.
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adjust to the gain rate, there is a reduction in the difference in outcomes
while if they adjust to the loss rate, there is an increase. If they adjust to
the average, both are better off but the winner gains more than the loser.42
These initial results do not support increasing marginal rates on
capital income. There will be clear efficiency losses but the distributive
gains are uncertain. The exact nature of the distributive gains (or possibly
losses) from increasing marginal rates depend on portfolio adjustments
that are the product of factors that are difficult to predict
V.

Must We Worry About Those Within a Wage Class Who
Spend Rather Than Save?
A.

Savings Heterogeneity

We have so far assumed that individuals within the same wage class
save the same amounts. If this is true, the tax on the return to savings is
merely a poor substitute for a tax on earnings. With no heterogeneity in
savings decisions, a tax on savings is by assumption the same as a tax on
earnings. Thus, in our running example, each class, rich, middle, and
poor, were entirely homogeneous – each individual in each of the classes
consumed the same number of figs or saved the same amount. A tax on
earnings, therefore, could replicate the tax on savings.
Earnings or ability classes, however, are likely to include individuals
with different propensities to save, with some individuals being savers and
some spenders (or any range in between). When there is heterogeneity in
savings, the replicating wage tax will only be able to replicate the tax on
savings on average for each wage class. Within each class, switching tax
systems will redistribute from spenders to savers. The merits of this type
of redistribution (or the reverse) is precisely the focus of the some of the
42

The numbers are as follows. If they adjust to the gain rate, the outcome is
$120/93. If they adjust to the loss rate, the outcome is $130/$90. If they adjust to the
average, the outcome is $124/$92.
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literature on consumption taxation and, thus, we must face directly the
arguments made in that literature.
We can illustrate the issue using our running example. Suppose that
there are two rich individuals rather than one and they differ in their taste
for figs. One of the rich consumes $30,000 of figs and the other consumes
only $20,000 (both tax inclusive). On average, they consume $25,000 of
figs, as in the example. If the tax adjustment is made as specified in the
example, so that the total labor tax is $62,500, the two rich individuals are,
on average indifferent. On average, they pay $62,500 under the wage/fig
tax and $62,500 under the more progressive wage tax. If we consider
ability classes as a whole, we can replicate the distributive effects of a tax
on figs with a more progressive tax on earnings.
Within the class of the rich, however, the two individuals are not
indifferent. Under the wage/fig tax, the individual who consumes $30,000
of figs paid $50,000 in labor taxes and $15,000 in fig taxes, adding to a
total of $65,000. The individual who consumed $20,000 in figs had total
taxes of $60,000. Under the more progressive wage tax, they both pay
$62,500 in taxes. The individual who favored figs is better off by $2,500
and the individual who favored prunes is worse off by $2,500.
(Conversely, if the tax adjustment were made in the opposite direction,
from wage tax to wage/fig tax, the redistribution would be in the opposite
direction.) The substitution of the more progressive wage tax for the
labor/fig tax redistributes within the class of rich individuals (even though
it does not redistribute among different classes of individuals). The same
would be true for any class of individuals where there is heterogeneity
within the class. Given that such heterogeneity is likely a fact of life, we
must ask whether redistribution from spenders or savers or savers to
spenders is desirable.
Proponents of income taxes argue that redistribution from savers to
spenders is desirable because savers are systematically better off than
spenders. One prominent reason, associated with Warren 1980, is that
even though in present value terms, their consumption is the same, savers
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have more total consumption than spenders and, therefore, are better off.
A second argument, not made in the tax literature but often made in the
behavioral economics literature, is that many individuals systematically
save too little and would be better off if they saved more. Finally, many
have argued that savings has value above and beyond the future
consumption it brings, such as security and power, and that we need an
income tax to tax this imputed income from savings. We explore each of
these arguments below, starting first with an attempt to set forth the
appropriate grounds of the debate and the basic welfarist argument against
redistributing from savers to spenders.
B.

Redistribution within Wage Classes v. Redistribution
Among Wage Classes or Redistribution from Unlucky to
Lucky

1.

Intraclass v. Interclass Redistribution.

Before beginning our analysis, it is worth emphasizing a point made
immediately above: The only redistribution we need worry about is the
redistribution within a wage class.
A common objection to a consumption tax is that it redistributes
from one wage class to another. The rich save more than the poor and
eliminating the tax on the return to saving benefits the rich. This is the
luxury tax argument highlighted above. The comparison when making the
luxury tax argument is between a $400,000 per year lawyer and a $20,000
per year janitor. A tax on savings has the effect of a luxury tax, since the
wealthy disproportionately save, and eliminating that tax benefits the
wealthy at the expense of the poor. Thus, a consumption tax increases the
burden on the janitors and lessens the burden of the lawyers – or so it is
argued. As discussed above, a consumption tax can be designed to avoid
the entire force of this argument. The sum of wage and savings taxes on
each wage class can be replicated with a wage tax. Thus, there is no net
redistribution from one wage class to another. We do find intraclass
redistribution: the burden of the $400,000 per year wage earner who
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spends rises relative to the $400,000 per year wage earner who saves; the
burden of the $20,000 per year wager earner who spends rises relative to
burden of the $20,000 per year wage earner who saves. It is the
desirability of this change in relative tax burden that we discuss below.
2. Return to Risk.
A second point to keep in mind is that the intraclass redistribution
stems only from the treatment of the risk-free return to savings. The
consumption tax is often opposed on the grounds that by not taxing the
return to investment it ignores the morally relevant difference between
winners and losers, investments that pay off and investments that do not.
As Michael Graetz said, “lucky gamblers are not the same as unlucky
gamblers.” Graetz 1979. Warren makes the same point: “if A and B nave
identical expectations about their financial futures but A's hopes are
dashed while B's wildest dreams are realized, should not a fair tax system
take into account the differences in outcome?" Warren 1980.
Whatever the merits of treating winners and losers differently, they
have nothing to say about the choice between an income tax and a
consumption tax. As noted, both treat returns to risk the same way. If
they tax capital at a flat rate, neither taxes the winners nor helping the
losers. If it is desirable to tax risk using graduated rates, both income and
consumption taxes can do so equally. In practice, either one might deviate
from this treatment, but there is no reason to believe that one tax base
systematically performs differently than the other in this regard.43
C.

A Welfarist Analysis of the Change in Intraclass Burden

Arguments for or against a consumption tax sometimes rely on
43

Warren argues on p. 1105 that the claim that income taxes do not tax risky
returns relies on an ex ante perspective. This argument is incorrect. An individual’s
consumption is the same in each period under a Haig-Simons tax and a tax only on the
risk-free return. See Kaplow 1994.
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framing for their rhetorical or normative force. Opponents of a
consumption tax argue that, all else equal, that tax will increase the burden
on those who do not save; supporters of a consumption tax argue that the
tax will eliminate the increased burden the income tax places on those who
save. The first argument implicitly appeals to the state of affairs under
existing law as a natural one and puts the burden on those who wish to
change that order; the second argument looks to the no-tax world as
natural and places the burden on those who would change that order.
There is, however, no reason to preserve positions in either the
income tax or no tax world. The only question to be asked is which
system, an income tax or a consumption tax, maximizes welfare. Under
conventional assumptions, the answer to that question is a consumption
tax maximizes welfare.
As usual, we compare the efficiency and distributive consequences
of the two systems. We can no longer use the Pareto criteria because the
spender may be worse off when we switch to the replicating wage tax.
Nevertheless, equalizing the tax rates on labor income – by eliminating the
indirect tax on labor income due to the tax on savings – produces welfare
gains. Consider, again, the effect of the replicating wage tax on the Rich
in our example. The tax rate on the Rich saver goes down from 65% to
62.5% and the tax rate on the spender goes up from 60% to 62.5%. The
efficiency gain from reducing the tax rate on labor income for savers
would be greater than the losses from increasing the tax rate on spenders
because efficiency losses increase with the square of the tax rate. The
efficiency gains are similar to the types of gains achieved from reducing
the level of rate graduation. Moreover, there is the additional efficiency
gain that is the primary subject of this article – the gain from eliminating
the distortion in consumption choices, between current consumption and
deferred consumption.
There is no reason to sacrifice these efficiency gains to redistribute
from savers to spenders. Although individual circumstances differ, as a
general matter individuals with the same wages or earnings ability can
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choose to spend or save, much like they can choose to consume prunes or
figs. The interest rate determines the relative prices of future and present
consumption just like various factors determine the relative prices of
prunes and figs. Given these prices, there is no reason to assume that
individuals who choose one or the other, prunes or figs, present or future,
are systematically better off. Indeed, if spenders and savers are equally
well off when the return to savings is not taxed, an income tax has worse
distributive consequences than a consumption tax because it makes them
unequal after-tax. Therefore, a consumption tax remains more efficient
than an income tax and, even taking into account savings heterogeneity,
has equally good, and perhaps better, distributive effects.
The conclusion that a consumption tax is strictly more desirable than
an income tax even with savings heterogeneity relies on the assumption
that individuals maximize their welfare through their consumption choices
– in particular, on the assumption that the decision by an individual to
consume today rather than save and consume tomorrow is welfare
maximizing. Opponents of a consumption tax reject this assumption.
They argue that the decision to consume $100 of figs today or save one’s
money at a market rate of return and purchase $110 of figs in 5 years is
different than the decision of whether to consume $100 of figs or prunes
today. The individual who chooses to consume $100 of figs today is in
the same position as the person who chooses to consume $100 of prunes
today but the person who chooses to consume $110 of figs in 5 years is
not in the same position as the person who chooses to consume $100 of
figs today. The assumption in this line of argument is that the saver is
better off or, at the very least, that there is no reason to suppose that the
saver isn’t better off. The fact that the market (or a particular individual)
values $100 today as equal to $110 in 5 years is seen as irrelevant (or at
least not dispositive). Arguments of this sort are sometimes used to
develop a fairness or horizontal equity case in favor of the income tax as
opposed to the consumption tax: the saver, who has more resources or has
consumed more, albeit at a later point in time, ought to pay more tax. The
income tax levies this additional tax and the consumption tax does not.
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It may be (but is not necessarily) the case that this type of reasoning
can be used to create a case for an income tax. The case will depend not
only on the assumption that spenders such as A are worse off than savers
such as B, but on a host of other factors, including the heterogeneity of
savings and the efficiency effects of each tax base. In the following
section, we examine the argument that savers are better off than spenders,
and the other assumptions necessary to establish a welfarist case for an
income tax.
D.

Are Savers Better Off Than Spenders?

1.

The Ex Post Perspective and Reasoning by Example.

Proponents and opponents of a consumption tax debate have often
relied upon hypotheticals to show why a dollar consumed today is or is not
equal to the future value of a dollar consumed tomorrow. Irving Fisher
argued for the former proposition in his tale of three brothers,44 and
virtually every commentator since has come up with a carefully
constructed hypothetical to illustrated his or her position on the matter.
For our purposes, it will be sufficient to join the debate in medias res, as
it were, with Alvin Warren’s 1980 article, Would a Consumption Tax be
Fairer than an Income Tax? With characteristic economy and rhetorical
flourish, Warren manages to build his hypothetical into a single sentence:
“It is not at all obvious that consumption of a bottle of fine wine 30 years
ago is, in any meaningful sense, equivalent to consumption of several
cases today.”
Warren’s hypothetical is meant to illustrate the different perspective
one gains by looking at the issue from an ex post perspective. It is one
thing, argues Warren, to use present value to discount future consumption
as against present consumption, and quite another to use the same discount
rate to match present consumption (the several of cases consumed today)

44

Fisher (1906)

Bankman and Weisbach

Page 42

as against past consumption (the bottle consumed 30 years ago). The fact
that this latter form of discounting seems inappropriate or odd casts doubt
upon the use of present value concepts that underlay many consumption
tax arguments.
Once we recognize that the only difference between an income tax
and a consumption tax is the taxation of the risk-free return to savings, the
difference between an ex ante perspective and an ex post perspective
evaporates. All the information known ex post is known ex ante so any
decision about who is better off can be made at either point in time.45
Therefore, it cannot be the case that fairness depends on one perspective
or another.
Nevertheless, Warren’s hypothetical creates a powerful intuitive
argument against discounting. We suspect the power of Warren’s
hypothetical, however, lies not in the perspective from which one
discounts but from the startlingly high discount rate used in his example.
The equivalence of one bottle to two-and-a-half (the midpoint of
“several”) cases implies an inflation-adjusted discount rate of
approximately 12%. The riskless interest rate is generally estimated at
around 1.5%.46 At that more realistic rate, the equivalent trade off would
be a bottle of wine thirty years ago and about a bottle and a half of wine
today. The individual who consumes several cases of wine today seems
better off than the individual who consumed a single bottle thirty years
ago because, in market terms, and from the perspective of all but those

45

The arguments in the philosophical or political economics literature in favor of
an ex post perspective uniformly rely on risk. See, e.g., Sen 1970. Where there is no
risk, these arguments do not apply.
46

Shuldiner ___. Note that while the consumption tax and income tax differ by
only the riskless rate of return, in evaluating the rationality of savings decisions, it is
appropriate to consider both the riskless rate of return and the inflation rate. In this
example, since we are dealing with goods, rather than money, we can ignore the inflation
rate. Any inflation-related change in the price of wine is already built into the example.
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with the highest internal discount rates, he is.47
Consider an equally stylized, but somewhat more realistic example.
A, B, and C each save $10,000 from a summer job in their last year at
college. A decides to use the money to pay for a European trip she takes
with her significant other. The two stay in youth hostels and eat at cheap
cafes. B saves his money and takes a similar trip with his wife ten years
later. They stay in two star hotels and eat at two star restaurants. C saves
her money at takes a similar trip with her significant other thirty years
later. They stay in three star hotels and eat at three star restaurants.
Our hypothetical also assumes a high discount rate (although not as
extreme a discount rate as Warren’s). One cannot invest at the riskless
interest rate and upgrade from a youth hostel today to a three star hotel in
30 years. We have, in this respect, built our hypothetical to make the
consumption pattern favored by the saver, C, look better. Nonetheless, we
have no intuition as to whether C has higher welfare than A. A has had
her pleasure earlier, and another 30 years in which to enjoy the memories
of her trip; C has higher explicit consumption, and perhaps has had years
of pleasure anticipating her trip.
2.

Studies on savings behavior.

a.

Experimental studies

The subject of intertemporal choice has generated a great deal of
literature, much of it in the relatively new fields of behavioral economics
or decision theory. Researchers in these fields commonly use controlled
47

The selection of wine as a consumption good raises other problems, though
perhaps not ones that directly affect the hypothetical. Wine is an acquired taste that times
to experience and appreciate. As one develops a nose for wine, each subsequent bottle
becomes more satisfying, so that the first bottle contributes to the enjoyment from later
bottles. See, Samuelson (1952) “the amount of wine I drink yesterday and will drink
tomorrow can be expected to have effects upon my today’s indifference slope between
wine and milk.”
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experiments, with college students as paid subjects, to gain insight into the
determinants of consumption patterns. For example, an experiment might
ask subjects how much they would pay or would have to be paid to move
up or back the delivery date of a consumer durable,48 or how they would
like to schedule a few free meals at a favorite French restaurant.49
One persistent experimental result is that the decisions subjects make
reveal extraordinarily high short-term discount rates. In one early study,
subjects were asked how much they would need to be paid in the future to
forgo $15 today; the results implied short-term discount rates well over
100%.50 These results have been replicated in a variety of later
experiments.51 Discount rates fall with time, however, and are much lower
and virtually constant after the first year.52 The declining rate of time
preference is commonly described as hyperbolic discounting. Moreover,
the high short-term discount rates fall dramatically as the amount at stake
increases.53
While hyperbolic discounting seems evidence that some individuals
will spend more than is rational – or at least more than would be expected
under standard discount utility theory – other experimental results point
in the opposite direction. For example, most subjects prefer an improving
sequence of consumption even if this means deferring present
consumption with no interest: $10 today and $12 next year is preferred

48

Loewenstein (1988).

49

Loewenstein and Prelec 1992.

50

Thaler (1981).

51

See Benzion Rapaport and Yagil (1989);Chaptman (1996);Redelmeir and
Heller (1993). See generally, Frederic, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002).
52
53

Frederic et al (2002).
See, Ainslie, and Hasla (1992); Green, Myerson and McFadden (1997).
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over $12 today and $10 next year.54 Thus, improving wage profiles are
preferred over wage profiles that start high and decline and provide higher
present value consumption.55
These and other results are sensitive to the construction or framing
of the experiment.56 Some of the more startling anomalies can be
explained in a manner consistent with rational decision-making. For
example, high discount rates may reflect the subjects’ perception of the
risk associated with deferred consumption.57 A preference for rising
consumption may conflict with standard discount utility theory but is
consistent with the so-called “new hedonics” literature, which shows (or
purports to show) that perceived welfare is affected not just by the
absolute level of consumption but by the pattern of consumption.58
b.

Retirement Savings and other Intertemporal Consumption
Decisions

Economists have attempted to measure discount rates rates by
looking at how individuals respond to choices involving temporal
tradeoffs. Many of these studies involve choices in which the discount
rate may be confounded by a lack of information. In this category are
studies that show individuals are unwilling to pay extra for energy saving
appliances or willing to trade in annuities for lump-sum payments with
lower present value (suggesting high discount rates) or that individuals are
54
55

See, generally, Federic, et al (2002).
Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991);Hsee, Abelson and Salovey (1991).

56

For example, one study shows the discount rate is sensitive to the number of
periods in which a given unit of time is partitioned. Subjects show higher discount rates
if they are asked to discount consumption on a month-by-month basis than if they are
asked to discount consumption on an annual basis. See Reed (2001).
57
58

See Frederic et al (2002).
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willing to expose themselves to increased risks tomorrow for higher pay
today (suggesting discount rates the authors deem “reasonable”).59
A significant body of recent look examines the adequacy of
retirement savings. A number of economists have concluded that many
lower income individuals in particular save too little.60 Evidence for this
position includes savings behavior consistent with hyperbolic discount
rates;61 survey results that show many Americans wished they’d saved
more;62 lack of knowledge and reliance on faulty heuristics in making
savings decisions.63 Other researchers have concluded the savings
decision of the poor are rational.64 One recent study found evidence of

59

See Hausman (19__);Ruderman, Levine and McMahon (1987);Moore and
Viscusi (199);Viscusi and Moore (1989)Warner and Pleeter (2001) (service personnel
offered choice of lump-sum payment or annuity that offered an implicit 17.5% rate of
return; more than three-quarters of enlisted personnel and half the officers selected a
lump-sum payment); but see Lawrence (1991) (discount rates between 4% and 13%).
60

See, e.g. Steven F. Venti, Choice, Behavior, and Retirement Savings
(December 2004), available at _________. (“On the whole, the research indicates that a
substantial proportion, and perhaps most, households in the U.S. fail to save “enough”
income for retirement.)
61

See, e.g.,Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes (2004) (Behavior of poor consistent with
hyperbolic discount rate)
62

See Employee Benefit Research Institute, 2004. The 2004 Retirement
Confidence Survey Summary of Findings. EBRI. Washington D.C., Choice, James,
Brigitte Madrian, Andrew Metrick and David Labison, For Better or Worse: Default
Effects and 401(c) Savings Behavior in David Wise (ed.) Perspectives in the Economics
of Aging 2004. See generally, the discussion of this issue in Venti, Choice, Behavior and
Retirement Savings op. cit. fn 54 at 8. See also
63
64

See Id at 4-6.

See Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995). See also Carrol and Samwick
(1997) (Savings of poor consistent with “buffer stock” model of savings, in which
consumers spend most of their life trying to maintain modest “target” wealth-income
ratios and begin saving for retirement only around 50.

Consumption Taxation

Page 47

both over and undersaving.65
A recent survey of the literature on this subject concluded that the
savings behavior of the upcoming group of baby boomer retirees is
comparable to that of earlier generations and that, due to increased wealth,
fewer members of the this generation will fall below the poverty line.66
On the other hand, the study also concluded that some segment of the
population saves too little to meet generally accepted standards of
retirement adequacy.
3.

Intertemporal consumption choices v. other consumption
choices

The decision to consume today or tomorrow is not the only
important consumption choice individual face, nor is it the only decision
that, if made incorrectly, might reduce welfare. Consider virtually every
other major choice made by individuals, such as the choice of spouse,
career, food, and housing. We suspect that these decisions are subject to
some of the same irrational forces as the savings decision, and indeed that
is a tentative conclusion of the behavioral economics literature.67 In a few
extreme cases, we use the tax system to intervene in these decisions by
increasing the cost of undesirable behavior through excise taxes. (We
discuss the relevance of this approach to undesirable spending behavior
in V, infra.). In all other cases, though, we take a neutral position with
respect to consumption decisions. We do not take this position because
we think individuals always maximize their welfare through their
decisions, but because we are uncertain about our ability to measure

65
66
67

CBO, Baby Boomers’ Retirement Prospects: An Overview (November, 2003)
See, e.g.,Lowenstein (1996).
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welfare and feel intervention may worsen, rather than improve matters.68
We look to satisfaction of preferences rather than actual welfare. Those
who share this sense of uncertainty as to experienced welfare with respect
to current consumption decisions might be expected to share a similar
sense of uncertainty with respect to intertemporal consumption decisions.
(Conversely, those who feel it appropriate to second-guess intertemporal
consumption decisions should feel it appropriate to second-guess current
consumption decisions.)
A final word about the difficulty of determining actual welfare, as
opposed to assuming all individuals with equal opportunity sets are
equally well off and realize equal welfare in preference satisfaction, is
perhaps appropriate here. We have thus far assumed that spenders and
savers differ only in their intertemporal consumption patterns. If we are
willing to assume that savers make worse intertemporal decisions, perhaps
we ought to entertain the possibility that the two groups differ in other
ways, as well. To suggest the path this line of reasoning might lead,
suppose we find that spenders are best described as pleasure loving,
expansive and in the moment, while savers are nervous and anxietyridden. In that case, we might conclude that savers are worse off than
spenders, though whether it would be welfare enhancing to redistribute
income to savers would be open to question.
E.

Is there Sufficient Heterogeneity among Wage Classes for
a Consumption Tax to Significantly Raise Tax Rates on
Spenders?

We have seen that while there is some evidence that some spenders
may spend foolishly, there is no real evidence as to the amount of welfare
loss experienced by spenders, or whether, if the tax system ought to look
through preference-based utility to experienced utility, it ought to start
(and stop) with foolish savings decisions. Suppose, though, that for the
68

For a discussion of the difficulty in correctly adjusting for one form of
mistaken preferences as to current consumption , see Strnad, Jeff, The Fat Tax ____.
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sake of argument we assume that spenders are clearly worse off than
savers. As noted above, this is relevant to the consumption tax debate
only if and to the extent there is heterogeneity in savings behavior among
the same wage class. An appropriately progressive consumption or wage
tax that replaces the income tax takes care of any distributional issues
among different wage classes.
In fact, an argument for an income tax based on savings
heterogeneity needs more than just some heterogeneity. It needs sufficient
heterogeneity that the benefits of redistributing from savers to spenders
offsets the efficiency losses from taxing the return to savings. That is, the
savings heterogeneity argument is an argument about redistribution, and
the extent of the alleged distributive benefits depends on the extent of
savings heterogeneity within wage classes, while the extent of the
efficiency losses is, to a large extent, unrelated to the heterogeneity.
The actual savings profile of various wage classes is an empirical
question that is sensitive to the data set used, the specification of the
model used to tease out savings rate from that data set, and so on.
However, current estimates suggest that nonsavers disproportionately fall
at the bottom of the income ladder and that nonsavers in this category, at
least, are unlikely to experience any real increase in tax burden as the
income tax is replaced by a wage tax. One recent study, for example,
gives the savings rate for the bottom quintile as -23%, 1.4% or 0,
depending on methodology and data set used.69 The savings rate for the
top quintile, which the authors acknowledge to be biased upward, ranges
from 44% to 23% to 18%, depending on the methodology and data set
used. No breakdown is given for the rate of savings within an income
class; however, it seems inconceivable that members of the bottom
quintile could be disadvantaged by the substitution of a wage or
consumption tax that raised the same amount of revenue from that group
as the current income tax. By and large, that group is only paying a wage
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tax now. There simply could not be enough tax collected from the savers
in that group to require any significant increase in the tax burden of the
nonsavers.
Venti and Wise use lifetime social security records to examine the
dispersion of wealth within households with similar lifetime earnings
patterns.70 They find considerable heterogeneity of savings within similar
wage groups. Nonetheless, an examination of their data shows it unlikely
that adoption of a replicating consumption tax would noticeably increase
the tax rate on nonsavers – at least those nonsavers in the bottom half of
the income brackets. For example, the mean household in the third decile
had approximately $110,000 in assets (excluding social security) at the
time the head of the household was between 51 and 62. The median
household in that group had assets of only about half that.71 The
difference between the median and mean was accounted for a relatively
few number of high savers. However, while the relative difference
between median and mean was high, the difference between the mean and
median as a percentage of labor income was not high, and the difference
in taxable investment income earned on that difference in wealth, as a
percentage of labor income, was presumably quite small. This is
particularly true because the difference in wealth was primarily comprised
of pensions and housing, both of which are effectively untaxed under an
income tax. Thus not only was investment return small compared to
wages, the high saving households in that bracket paid little tax on
investment income. As a result, it is reasonable to believe that income
could be replaced with only a slight increase in taxes on labor.
F.

Might a Consumption Tax Benefit Rather Than
Disadvantage Foolish Spenders?

We have seen that a primary objection to the consumption tax is that,
70
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relative to the income tax (though not to the no-tax world) it increases the
tax burden on spenders. This is seen as a morally relevant distinction
because spenders are seen as worse off than savers. Spenders and savers
may be presented the same opportunity set but those who save are seen as
having higher welfare than those who spend, at least when measured from
an ex post perspective. An income tax is superior because it recognizes
this distinction, and levies a higher tax on the spender.
A primary difficulty with this line of reasoning is that an income tax
has another consequence as well: it increases the cost of saving, thus
encouraging spending over saving and exacerbating the very problem it
is claimed to ameliorate. A consumption tax, by contrast, may increase
the tax burden on some spenders (depending on the degree of
heterogeneity) but, relative to an income tax, will encourage saving over
consumption. Which subgroups of the population will respond to the
change in relative prices of current and deferred consumption, and to what
extent, is obviously an empirical question. Consider, for example, a
decline in the price of figs. The primary effect of the lower price might be
to cause those who already eat a lot of figs to eat more. Alternatively, the
lower price might cause those who previously preferred prunes to figs on
cost grounds to switch their preferences. The same questions are raised,
within a wage group, with respect to a change in the price of deferred
consumption.
It is possible, however, to describe two effects of the change to a
replicating wage tax on those who fall in the low savings category. First,
for all but the members of this group that have absolutely no interest in
deferred consumption, the removal of the current excise tax on deferred
consumption will generate a perceived welfare gain. The analysis here is
identical to that described above with respect to Middle and Rich
taxpayers described above. Second, the actual welfare gain will be greater
than the perceived welfare gain because, by hypothesis here, members of
this group fail to save enough – at least in the income tax world.
Indeed, reducing the tax on savings is a wholly conventional tax
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response to a perceived problem that some individuals reduce their welfare
through excessive spending. It is similar to the paternalist rationale
(among other rationales) for subsidies on other goods and services, such
as health care. Seen in this light, supporting an income tax, which
encourages spending, out of solicitude for those who are made worse off
by spending, is perverse. It is like noting the welfare-reducing effects of
smoking and seeking to help smokers by reducing the price of cigarettes.
G.

Conclusion

We are finally at the point where we can state the conditions under
which solicitude for the spender provides an argument for an income tax.
First, we must believe that present consumption provides less welfare than
deferred consumption. Second, we must believe that spenders cannot
understand this or act upon this knowledge so that subsidizing spending
and penalizing savings does not make spenders even more worse off.
Third, there must be heterogeneity of savings sufficient for a replicating
wage or consumption tax to significantly increase the burden on spenders.
This decline in spender welfare from that increased burden must exceed
the sum of a) the increase in spender welfare from increased savings, if
any; b) the increase in saver welfare from the reduction in tax on labor
income; and c) the increase in saver welfare from the elimination of the
excise tax on deferred consumption. The odds that all those conditions are
met seems quite low.
This conclusion – that solicitude for the spender cannot justify an
income tax – is relatively insensitive to assumptions one makes as to the
declining marginal utility of income or the weight one gives to the welfare
of the poor. Suppose, for example, that one is primarily concerned with
the welfare of those in the bottom quartile of income. A consumption tax
would increase the welfare of those in the top three quartiles and one
could use that gain to redistribute to the bottom quartile. Within the
bottom quartile the replicating consumption tax would be only slightly
higher than the current wage tax (because there is not much tax on savings
that would need to be replaced). Even without the infusion of funds from
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the upper three quartiles, the replicating wage tax should increase welfare
within the bottom quartile for the reasons described immediately above.
Indeed, the replicating wage tax should increase welfare within each wage
group. The infusion of those additional funds from the upper quartiles
would further increase welfare, to the point at which the consumption tax
would almost certainly be Pareto superior to all those in the bottom
quartile.
VI.

Does Savings Bring Value Beyond Future Consumption?

Consumption tax opponents often argue that savers, unlike spenders,
get intangible benefits from holding wealth, and that these benefits that are
not captured by a consumption tax. For example, Murphy and Nagel
(2002) at 115 argue:
It should be obvious that wealth is an independent source of
welfare, quite apart from the fact that some of it may be consumed
later. As Henry Simons famously put it, in 1938, ‘In a world
where capital accumulation proceeds as it does now, there is
something sadly inadequate about the idea of savings as postponed
consumption.’ Commentators typically mention such factors as
security, political power, and social standing.
See also Treasury 1984 at Vol. 1, p. 209 (“If accumulation of wealth has
value beyond the consumption that it can buy – if it confers power,
prestige, or peace of mind – then annual consumption does not measure
equals.”).
Strictly speaking, an income tax misses these intangible benefits as
well. It is argued, however, that by taxing the explicit return to savings,
an income tax levies an indirect tax on these benefits. Thus, it is argued
that an income tax offers a second-best way of taxing the imputed benefits
of wealth. For the reasons described below, the argument is incorrect.
First, the argument, even if true, would not raise distributional issues

Bankman and Weisbach

Page 54

under the replicating consumption or wage tax proposal we outline. This
is because to the extent savings are constant within wage classes, the
sources of welfare or utility from savings are irrelevant for distributional
purposes. Distributional equity is held constant by the consumption or
wage tax. To the extent there is savings heterogeneity, untaxed intangible
benefits from wealth would create distributional concerns only if we
believe spenders do not maximize their own welfare, and then it is by no
means clear that taxing these benefits would ameliorate, rather than
exacerbate, the welfare loss caused by excessive spending. Because
intangible benefits from savings are simply a subset of benefits from
savings, the analysis in the previous section of this paper would extend to
these forms of benefits.
The primary issue raised by the intangible-benefits-from-wealth
argument is, instead, efficiency. If part of the consumption stream from
savings, the intangible benefits of wealth, is untaxed, it will be taxpreferred over other forms of consumption. People might seek too much
security, status, and prestige.72 If correct, we might be concerned about
these efficiency consequences.
The efficiency concerns, however, are baseless. The reason is that
a consumption tax accurately captures the consumption of intangible
benefits associated with savings because those benefits are a function of
net after-tax consumption, rather than the gross amount of savings. A
consumption tax reduces consumption and in so doing, reduces those
benefits. The point is ably made by Shaviro (2004; 106):
Why does wealth offer security, political power, and social
standing? The answer must be because of its value – that is,
because of what it can be used to buy. . . . savings and wealth are
indeed subsidiary to consumption in that they derive their value
72
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entirely from that potential use, whether its exercise is proximate
or not. That ability to buy things is, after all, the difference
between real money and play money from board games such as
Monopoly and Life.
A consumption tax, by taxing goods purchased with savings, taxes these
intangible benefits. For example, assume that the knowledge of available
consumption gives a saver the sense of security because she knows that
when she desires or needs something, she will have the money available.
The imposition of a consumption tax reduces the amount available. This
in turn reduces the security (or power or prestige) associated with the
savings.
We can even go further than Shaviro, and argue that power and
prestige likely come more from labor than from savings. To see why this
may be the case, it may be useful to compare an individual with a $20
million diversified portfolio that provides explicit consumption of $2
million a year with a group of chief executive officers whose salaries
provide the same explicit consumption. As noted above, to the extent the
individual with the brokerage account realizes welfare from security, that
welfare is a function of after-tax consumption and is effectively taxed by
a consumption tax. The securities in her portfolio are unlikely to give her
any power whatsoever over the companies in which she invests. Most
other forms of wealth-related power seem a function of after-tax
consumption rather than before-tax savings. The power over perspective
beneficiaries, for example, is ultimately a function of the amount of (aftertax) consumption any gifts might fund. Political power realized through
the prospect of contributions would also be a function of after-tax
consumption, since contributions would be treated (then as now) as nondeductible consumption under a cash-flow tax. The only apparent case in
which power might be a function of before-tax savings is power over
charitable organizations attributable to future donations, since gifts would
presumably be deductible under a consumption as under an income tax.
Any prestige or respect that comes from wealth is much more likely to be
a function of her past or future consumption, which is or will be public,
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than the before-tax amount of her holdings. Again, since a consumption
tax reduces the amount of consumption, it will reduce the imputed income
from that form of consumption-related benefit.
The executives, in contrast, realize enormous power relative to their
explicit consumption or the capitalized value of their future consumption
stream. They are apt to have an army of subordinates, decide on the
allocation of substantial amounts of capital and so on. They are apt to be
accorded more respect than the holder of the brokerage account, both
because respect often accompanies power and because, to the extent
respect accompanies wealth, their wealth is more visible.
The same relationship between savings and wages and these sorts of
intangible benefits seems to hold for individuals will lower levels of less
wealthy. An attorney with an income of $250,000 is apt to have more
power and prestige than someone with an equivalent amount of
consumption financed through the return from savings.
The final objection to the imputed income from savings argument is
that the rationale for including within the tax base these forms of
intangible benefits but excluding other intangible benefits and burdens
associated with consumption or income seems unclear.73 As noted in the
previous section, consumption may bring with it regret, anticipation,
pleasant memories and the like. Labor carries with it an even wider
variety of intangible benefits, including the very benefits mentioned in
connection with savings. Focusing only on a few of the benefits and
burdens associated with deferred consumption is apt to produce
misleading policy proposals.
The argument that intangible benefits from savings supports an
income tax is in many way similar to the argument that foolish
consumption decisions of spenders supports an income tax. Each
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argument requires that we depart from conventional analysis, and look at
individual measures of welfare that are impossible to measure. Each
argument selectively choose only certain measures of welfare to examine.
And yet neither argument, if carried out on its own terms, shows than an
income tax is superior to a consumption tax.
VII.

Why Earnings?

We want to close with an exploration of some of the deeper, implicit
assumptions of the models we rely upon for our arguments. AS 1976, and
many economic models of taxation, start with a belief that taxes should
maximize social welfare which is a function solely of individual utilities.
They end with the conclusion that we should tax earnings, usually with the
intermediate step that earnings are a good surrogate for ability. Earnings
are not ability, and ability is not utility. It is not even clear what ability is
at all. Indeed, welfarists regularly condemn references in tax arguments
to ability to pay. (Griffith, date; Kaplow, date; Simons (1938, 31)
(attempts to go beyond an objective concept of income “lead[] directly
back into the utter darkness of ‘ability’ or ‘faculty’ or, as it were, into a
rambling uncharted course pointed only by fickle sentiments.”). The
question is how these factors relate to one another, and why taxing
earnings is the best way to maximize utility. Nothing in the proofs make
this connection. Instead, it comes from the way that the models are set up
and the particular parameters of the utility functions they use. These
assumptions, often implicit and unquestioned in the models, deserve to be
examined if we are to put our faith in the models.
We break the discussion into two steps. First we discuss why ability
is thought to be central to utility and, therefore, central to taxation.
Second, we discuss the extent to which labor earnings are a good measure
of ability. Included in this second point is a discussion of whether there
are other possible measures of ability and if there are, how they affect the
AS 1976 conclusions.
A.

Ability and Utility
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The economics literature generally assumes that ability is the central
attribute that should be taxed. The only reason we do not tax ability is
because it is not observable, and therefore we must tax surrogates, such as
labor earnings. The same literature, however, assumes we are trying to
maximize social welfare, which is a function of utility, not a function of
ability. The question is how we get from utility to ability.
Ability and utility are connected in the models because utility is
assumed to be a function of consumption and leisure time. More
consumption, more leisure, or both, are assumed to increase utility.
Someone with a higher ability to earn has more choices with respect to
consumption and leisure than does someone with a lower ability. The
higher ability individual can choose equal consumption and more leisure,
more consumption and equal leisure, or any combination. Earnings
ability, therefore, increases an individual’s choice set and for this reason
is assumed to increase utility. Someone with high ability could always
mimic a person with low ability but need not and, therefore, is at least as
well off and likely better off.74
It may be the case that this approach is wildly off the mark. It is
entirely an empirical question whether those with higher ability have
higher utility, although measuring either is fraught with difficulties. We
can imagine other cases. Perhaps, for example, individuals all have equal
utility (and marginal utility) – Bill Gates might have no greater utility than
a pauper. We can, alternatively tell stories where individuals with high
ability are worse off and individuals with low ability are better off. A
brilliant individual may suffer from existential crises, and an individual of
low ability may find abiding happiness. Perhaps those able to reach
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Going back to economics 101, we can think of individuals as having an
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curve.
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certain meditative states or runner’s highs are the best off. Research into
utility levels, under the rubric of happiness research, may yield yet entirely
different conclusions about factors that affect utility. This is an old
controversy, dating back to the origins of utilitarianism and continuing
into modern times Bentham (1789) (push-pin poetry controversy) Sen,
(various dates).
We suspect, however, that arguing over the exact components of
individual utility or welfare, interesting and valuable as it may be, is
orthogonal to the debate between an income tax and a consumption tax.
Thinking about other sources of utility may lead to suggestions for
taxation based on very different parameters, but the arguments for both
income and consumption taxes depend on relatively conventional
assumptions about utility increasing with consumption and leisure time.
The assumption that higher ability leads to higher utility implies or
includes within it an assumption that utility does not vary with
preferences. Although different individuals may have different tastes,
given the same capacity to consume and the same leisure time, the models
assume their utility will be the same. The primary reason for this is that
we are reluctant to make judgments about these sort of choices. Chocolate
might really be better than vanilla, but we do not feel confident that
chocolate lovers systematically have higher utility than vanilla lovers.
Economics models, therefore, do not permit utility to vary based on
preferences of this sort. In a sense, they are models of preference
satisfaction rather than utility (or, using the standard term, economists
using these models are preference utilitarians). The Penguin Dictionary
of Philosophy (19__)
The discussion about spenders and savers above was effectively
about this issue. Income tax supporters claim is that savers are
systematically better off than spenders are – saving really is better than
spending even if chocolate is not really better than vanilla, or figs better
than prunes. As discussed above, while there is some evidence that, at the
margin, for some subset of the population, savings would be better than
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current consumption, that evidence is not uncontested and even for that
subset of the population, that proposition does not imply that an income
tax is superior to a consumption tax.
2.

Earnings and Labor Income

The second major assumption in the AS 1976 argument is that wages
are the only way to measure earnings ability. Wages certainly are an
important way of measuring earnings ability. After all, the models assume
earnings ability increases utility because it increases choice. It can only
increase choice by increasing wage rates (or the possibility of earning a
high wage, even if an individual chooses not to). Therefore, taxing wages
(or consumption) will be at least part of taxing ability. There may,
however, be other methods of measuring ability.
In particular, there may be goods that are differentially consumed by
those of high ability. Nichols and Zeckhauser 1982 referred to these as
“indicator goods.” The idea is that at any given level of income, those
high ability individuals who are shirking – choosing leisure over labor
because of the tax on labor – will be likely to consume a different set of
items than those of who have lower ability but are working hard. The
replicating wage tax strategy does not work with indicator goods.
Because individuals with the same labor income but different abilities
make different choices with respect to the indicator goods, the replicating
wage tax cannot differentiate individuals on this basis. The presence of
indicator goods, therefore, provides an additional tool (beyond wage or
consumption taxation) to identify those of high ability.
Indicator goods do not arise in AS 1976, because individuals were
assumed to be identical except with respect to their wage rates. That is,
in their model, individuals varied only in one way, wage rates, and,
therefore, did not have differing preferences. The only way to
differentiate individuals, therefore, was based on wages. It is highly likely
that individuals are heterogeneous in their tastes, so the possibility of
indicator goods is real.
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Finding examples of indicator goods is tricky because we need to be
able to observe ability. That is, we have to find items that those of high
ability consume (or fail to consume) independent of their earnings.
Because ability cannot be observed directly, we have to make implicit
judgments about various tastes as a signal of ability.
Nichols and Zeckhauser do not offer any examples of indicator
goods. (They use a hypothetical to illustrate the issue, but do not
explicitly state that they believe the hypothetical to be indicator good.)
Kaplow (2004) suggests that high-brow culture is such a good. Long
abstract novels and plays, modern art, and classical music arguably require
greater ability to appreciate. Therefore, those with higher ability are more
likely to consume these items independent of income, and these items thus
should be taxed. Saez (2002) uses the example of smoking tobacco. He
argues that those with higher ability tend to smoke less and “this clearly
cannot be due to the mechanical fact that they have higher disposable
income.” Saez at 226. All else equal a subsidy for smoking or
equivalently, a tax on “not smoking” (the “activity” of the high ability
people), would be desirable if Saez is correct. The reason is that a tax on
individuals for failing to smoke cannot be replicated with a labor income
tax and the activity of not smoking correlates with ability. Blumkin and
Sadka (2005) suggest that education might be an indicator good. Taxing
education allows us to tax those of high ability in ways that merely taxing
wages does not.
These claims are empirically unverifiable, although they have
intuitive appeal. We have to be careful, however, that their intuitive
appeal is not a result of acculturation. At a minimum, items such as
smoking (or not) or high brow culture may appeal to individuals of
differing ability at different times in history.
While it is interesting to debate the merits of these subtle and often
odd taxes, our question is whether we should have a tax on the return to
savings (at the same rate as the tax on labor income). Those who argue for
a tax on savings because of its redistributive effect make precisely the

Bankman and Weisbach

Page 62

wrong argument in this respect. They argue that only the wealthy can save
– the poor must spend all of their resources merely to survive. This claim,
however, suggests that savings depends entirely on resources rather than
being related to some innate ability. The rich save more because they
have more to save. The AS 1976 argument shows that this rationale is
wrong because a tax on savings is merely a substitute for a tax on earnings
and a direct tax on earnings is superior. Instead, to justify a tax on savings
on the grounds discussed in this section, savings would have to depend on
ability, not earnings. Those with low ability would have to save less than
those with high ability even at the same income level (or changes in
savings would have to be different than changes in income). This is a
different claim, and one which is much more difficult to establish.
The only commentator we know of who has made this argument is
Saez (2002). He suggests that savings is an indicator good. (He does not
use that term, but his definition if essentially the same as Nichols and
Zechauser’s.) Therefore, we would want to tax savings as a way of taxing
ability.75 He cites a single paper, Lawrance (1991), for support but says
that the claim is also supported generally in the literature. Our search of
the literature, however, shows that the correlation of savings with ability
is unknown. The reason is that we have no independent measure of
ability. It might be the case that people tend to save too little. Those who
75

Saez claim has additional problems even if one accepts his claim. He argues,
“higher income individuals ave more not only because they have more income to save but
also because they might have a better financial education and be more aware of the need
to save for retirement.” Saez at 228. Savings rates under his argument, however, do not
depend directly on ability. Instead, they depend on education which in turn depends on
ability. Rather than taxing savings, however, we could tax education as the more directly
signal of ability.
A second problem with Saez’s argument is that he only shows that a marginal
tax on some commodities might be optimal and illustrates this with a two period example
and a tax on savings. In the two period example, a tax on savings can be marginal, but in
the more realistic, infinite horizon case, it cannot. None of his proofs go through when
the tax on the commodity is non-marginal, so we cannot learn anything from his model
about whether a tax on savings is desirable.
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save more, under this argument, have higher ability because they are smart
enough to avoid the trap of saving too little. But this seems circular – it
defines the act of saving as meaning that an individual has high ability
rather than independently trying to measure ability and correlating it with
savings rates. The studies themselves cannot sort this out because they
have no independent measure of ability.76 Thus, while it is possible that
savings is an indicator good, there is little evidence to support this view
and to the extent it is, we suspect it is so only because understanding the
need for savings takes education and education is an indicator of ability.
In this case, we would want to tax education directly rather than tax
savings
VIII. Conclusion
Supporters of an income tax have argued that any efficiency gains
realized from switching to a consumption tax are overstated: Eliminating
of the tax on savings will require higher taxes on wages and efficiency
gains from eliminating the first tax will reduced or offset by the efficiency
loss by increasing that latter tax.
Supporters of an income tax also make a number of related
normative arguments. They argue that a consumption tax is regressive
because it reduces the tax burden on savers, and savings rates rise with
income or wealth. They also argue that, among those with equal
opportunity sets, those who save are better off than those who spend.
They are better judges of their own welfare and, in addition, benefit from
the non-taxation of imputed income from savings.
We show that none of these arguments is correct. The tax on
savings is a tax on labor that produces that savings, and it is a particularly
inefficient tax on that labor. Replacing that tax with a direct tax on labor,
or an economically equivalent consumption tax, will generate efficiency
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gains and appropriately tax most forms of imputed income realized
savings and deferred consumption. It will also leave the tax burden
unchanged among those with equal wages, or who for other reasons find
themselves with equal opportunity sets.
A properly designed consumption tax should be more desirable even
if, as is sometimes claimed, many individuals undersave, reducing their
own welfare and reducing their welfare relative to those with equal
opportunity sets. A consumption tax will always increase the welfare of
savers. But under most assumptions, it will also increase the welfare of
those who save too little. Most of those who are said to undersave are
poor, and would benefit from redistribution of some of the efficiency gains
realized by the wealthy. More generally, if individuals save less than is
optimal for their own welfare, conventional tax policy would be to
encourage savings by eliminating an income tax in favor of a consumption
tax.
Our analysis is based on a comparison of ideal tax regimes. A
comparison of non-ideal systems would strengthen our conclusion. Under
any plausible assumptions, a properly designed consumption tax is
superior to an income tax on welfarist grounds.
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